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Abstract 
This study examines how technology adoption is determined in an intra-household 
bargaining process between spouses with different incentives and resource constraints. We 
develop a noncooperative bargaining model in which individual investments affect not only 
a household’s total income but also its members’ future bargaining position, which can yield 
Pareto-inferior outcomes. To test for possible inefficiency, we introduce rice seeds to 
farmers in rural Zambia and randomly distribute vouchers for transportation from the village 
to a miller in town to husbands and wives. The results show that the identity of the voucher 
recipients matters for rice seed take-up when wives choose which crop to grow on suitable 
plots for rice production. We also find that the voucher given to husbands is effective only 
when they manage the plots by themselves. Furthermore, intra-household information flows 
are distorted by the recipients. The heterogeneous effects and incomplete information 
sharing among spouses provide evidence against efficient resource pooling within the 
family. We present suggestive evidence that limited commitment to the production plan is 
a key mechanism behind strategic spousal behavior. Overall, this study highlights the 
importance of directly targeting individuals with productive resources relevant to a 
technology. 
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1. Introduction 
Seemingly profitable technologies are being adopted slowly across a wide range of goods 
and contexts in developing countries. Typical examples include agricultural technologies 
(e.g., inorganic fertilizer), health products (e.g., mosquito nets), financial products (e.g., 
microinsurance), and household initiatives (e.g., migration). This empirical puzzle has 
received much attention from economists, and an extensive literature has identified the 
factors acting as constraints preventing the adoption of new technologies among the poor in 
developing countries.1 Common explanations for the weak adoption of new technologies 
include tight cash/credit constraints (Carter et al. 2013; Beaman et al. 2015), existing 
uninsurable risks (Karlan et al. 2014; Emerick et al. 2016), a lack of knowledge about how 
to use technology and what their private returns are (Bryan, Chowdhury, and Mobarak 2014; 
Emerick and Dar 2019), and the absence of supporting markets for consistent supply and 
maintenance (Hanna, Duflo, and Greenstone 2016). However, these important impediments 
are all at the household level. In practice, each family member, with their own diverse 
preferences and resource constraints, is involved in household decision making. The targets 
of policy initiatives will differ depending on individuals’ incentives to adopt a new 
technology and the binding constraints each faces. This study seeks to illustrate the 
importance of intra-household bargaining processes in technology adoption in rural sub-
Saharan contexts. 
       At the individual level, the gender division of household responsibilities implies 
that the benefits of adopting a new technology could be unequal among the spouses. For 
example, Pitt, Rosenzweig, and Hassan (2010) find that women may bear a disproportionate 
share of health costs from indoor air pollution due to the unequal time burdens of food 
preparation and thus can reap greater benefits from the adoption of cleaner cookstoves. In 
another example, Dercon and Krishnan (2000) show that women are more adversely 
affected than are men by household-level negative income shocks, suggesting that the 
benefits of risk-mitigating products accrue more to females than to males. However, 
irrespective of females’ higher demand for such new technologies, their wishes may be 
overturned by their husbands due to their greater financial control, leading to an overall low 
demand (Miller and Mobarak 2013; Gulati et al. 2019). Thus, relative bargaining positions 
among spouses within the household may have a significant impact on household-level 
technology adoption.  
       African agriculture provides us a fruitful setting in which to examine this imbalance. 
Agro-ecological conditions are fundamental determinants in agricultural technology 
adoption, such as crop variety choices. For instance, rice (our target crop) requires a great 
deal of water, making wetlands the most suitable areas for cultivation if there is no access 
to irrigation. Given that land rental markets are not active in many parts of sub-Saharan 
                                                 
1 See Jack (2013) and Magruder (2018) for an excellent review, with a focus on agricultural technology adoption.   
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Africa, whether the household has access to suitable land for a particular crop would 
determine the level of agricultural investment made. Disparity in access to land can be 
observed not only across households but also within households. In particular, gender 
inequality in control over farm land in marriage is well-documented in married couples 
(Doss et al. 2015; Doss et al. 2018).2 The literature has also found a misallocation of 
agricultural inputs between female and male plots, and thus a significant loss of household 
income (Udry 1996). Given that relative contributions to household budgets are a 
determinant of marital bargaining power (Thomas 1990; Hoddinott and Haddad 1995), the 
identity of the family members who control agricultural plots relevant to a technology would 
affect household technology decisions through changes in their bargaining positions.  
       This study investigates how monetary incentives targeted to a particular spouse 
under gender-differentiated constraints on land resources shape household technology 
adoption behavior. We start with a simple bargaining model involving a case of limited 
commitment in a two-period setting, as in Lundberg and Pollak (1993) and Slootmaker 
(2014). In the model, spouses cannot follow the Pareto-efficient production plan since they 
face different incentive compatibilities and potential moral hazard problems in the future 
period. For this reason, we extend the model with endogenous outside options by allowing 
strategic interactions between spouses. We impose the following assumptions in the 
framework: (1) each gender has a comparative advantage in different production activities 
(e.g., women are more productive in milling than men), and (2) individuals’ agricultural 
investments determine not only total household income but also the relative future 
bargaining positions within the couple. Building upon these assumptions, the model predicts 
the possibility of sub-optimal outcomes in household equilibrium, wherein the monetary 
incentive targeted to an individual may not be effective for technology adoption when the 
other spouse is a plot manager since he/she has little incentive to share it with that spouse. 
Thus, the effectiveness of policies aimed at encouraging technology adoption depends on 
the identities of the policy targets and the plot managers.  
We test the validity of our theory by conducting a randomized controlled trial in 
which monetary incentives to grow rice are offered to either males (husbands, who have 
greater control over household resources) or females (wives/female household heads) in 
rural Zambia. We introduced rice seeds, new to most of the local farmers, and gave 
randomly selected households vouchers covering the cost of transportation from their 
village to a designated miller in town, conditional on their milling rice there. The important 
feature of the study area is that management rights over plots are individualized, and a good 
number of wives also have the authority to choose which crop to grow for agricultural fields. 
Specifically, female plot managers have greater control than their male counterparts over 
                                                 
2 In addition, the risk of losing such land assets, reflecting local institutions, may be disproportionately higher for women 
than for men (Dillon and Voena 2018). 
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crop choice for shallow wetlands, called “dambo” in the local area, which provides a 
productive environment for rice production.   
Empirical analyses using sex-disaggregated data on land management reveal that 
vouchers given to wives induce more demand for rice seeds than do vouchers given to 
husbands in households where the wife controls the dambo. This result indicates that the 
identity of the voucher recipient matters for technology adoption in this sub-population. We 
also find that plot managers’ gender also affects household decision making since the 
monetary incentives given to husbands are effective in boosting household demand only 
when they control the dambo plot. Individual-level demand analyses show that the favorable 
impacts on total household demand come mostly from the high interest level of the dambo 
manager who received the transportation voucher. When the voucher recipient is different 
from the dambo manager within the household, the responses to the treatment look similar 
between the husband and wife. These heterogeneous effects can be accounted for by neither 
the canonical unitary household model nor the Pareto-efficient collective models. Rather, 
the empirical findings are consistent with the prediction of the non-cooperative bargaining 
model with feedback to future outside options.  
Further analysis shows that the voucher recipient is less likely to communicate with 
his/her spouse about the voucher when the recipient and the dambo manager are different 
family members. The theoretical framework suggests that the observed incomplete 
information sharing among spouses can be interpreted as an outcome of the strategic 
behavior of the voucher recipients. This study also reports that purchase households are 
more likely to plant rice seeds when the voucher recipient takes responsibility for the 
management of the dambo plots. This result suggests the salience of limited commitment to 
future production plans in the context of agricultural investments. By contrast, gender 
differences regarding knowledge of rice cultivation and perceptions about the role of rice 
(food vs. cash crop/male vs. female crop) do not match well with the empirical patterns of 
demand for rice seeds among spouses.  
Our findings contribute to three strands of the literature. First, this empirical 
examination is one of the first to study the role of intrahousehold bargaining in technology 
adoption among developing countries. Previous studies in this domain focus on gender 
differences in preferences as a key driver of low demand (see Miller and Mobarak (2013) 
and Mohapatra and Simon (2017) regarding cookstoves, Gulati et al. (2019) regarding 
agricultural machinery, Magnan et al. (2019) regarding improved maize seeds, Schaner 
(2015) regarding saving accounts, and Takahashi et al. (2016) and Bageant and Barrett 
(2017) regarding index insurance)3. By contrast, our study underscores gender differences 
                                                 
3 Among them, Miller and Mobarak (2013) is a notable complementary study. In their demand experiment on improved 
cookstoves in Bangladesh, women showed higher demand initially but were less likely to adopt them in the end because 
they lacked the authority to make purchasing decisions. Magnan et al. (2019) test how spousal preferences influence the 
adoption of an improved maize seed in rural Tanzania. The results from one of two survey regions show that wives’ risk 
preference parameters, experimentally elicited by prospect theory-based risk games, also have an explanatory power for 
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in resource management and presents empirical evidence that the effectiveness of policy 
interventions depends on who controls the relevant productive resources within the 
household. The study’s model derives the important prediction that even if preferences are 
symmetric among spouses, second-best outcomes can be chosen as equilibrium through an 
intra-household bargaining process. In this vein, Lim, Winter-Nelson, and Arends-
Kuenning (2007) investigate the role of exit options available to each spouse as a threat 
point in household crop choice. While they treat livestock disposition upon divorce as an 
exogenous determinant of outside options, our model allows current investment decisions 
to affect future say in decisions within marriage. Other studies have found that the 
introduction of a new technology and subsequent agricultural commercialization can alter 
gender norms and hence power relationships within the household (von Braun and Webb 
1989; Fischer and Qaim 2012; Carney and Carney 2018). This study focuses on the opposite 
direction.  
Second, our work makes a direct contribution to the broad literature on intra-
household allocation and targeting (Alderman et al. 1995; Doss 2013). A vast literature has 
examined allocative and productive efficiency and highlighted the importance of modelling 
the household as a site of both cooperation and conflict among family members.4 The 
unequal distribution of productive resources does not per se imply inefficient allocations for 
households, if it is a result of specialization among members.5 However, this interpretation 
has been convincingly contested by empirical studies on West Africa (see Udry (1996) for 
Burkina Faso, Duflo and Udry (2004) for Cote d’Ivoire, and Goldstein and Udry (2008) and 
Slootmaker (2014) for Ghana). We add to the subset of this rich literature novel evidence 
that household technology adoption decisions could be Pareto-inefficient, indicating that 
spouses cannot stick to the efficient production plan and thus that individual agricultural 
investments determine future bargaining positions within the family. Walther (2018) is the 
closest to our study.6  She tests implications from a non-cooperative collective model 
similar to ours in which spouses are unable to commit to a particular labor allocation. By 
exploiting the spatial distributions of descent rules in Malawi, her study reports that farmers 
with their own plots will overinvest labor in them to improve their future bargaining position 
                                                 
household seed choice after the husbands’ parameters are controlled for.  
4 From the consumption side, Duflo (2003) finds that unearned income received by women is associated with greater 
improvements in child health than is that received by men. A classic paper by Thomas (1990) also confirms that unearned 
income in the hands of wives is devoted more to expenditures on education, health care, and food using data from Brazil. 
Duflo and Udry (2004) show that harvest income shocks on male and female crops have different effects on the types of 
goods consumed in rural Cote d’Ivoire. From the production side, Udry (1996) reports the presence of agricultural input 
misallocation among male- and female-controlled plots, generating yield differences across these two types of fields. 
Similar differences have been observed between Burkinabe’s collectively and individually managed plots by Haider, Smale, 
and Theriault (2018). Rangel and Thomas (2019) empirically test these two kinds of household efficiency based on the 
same dataset.  
5 For example, it would be natural if productive resources were allocated according to differences in individuals’ earning 
abilities and the maximized income shared among members (Doepke and Tertilt 2019). In such a case, the gender division 
of labor and responsibilities will be optimal under the assumption of heterogeneous productivities.  
6 Also see Zepeda and Castillo (1997) for the role of bargaining in technology adoption in the US dairy farm context.   
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within the household. 
Third, this study is also related to the literature on land inequalities between men 
and women in sub-Saharan Africa and their economic consequences (Doss et al. 2015).7 
Quisumbing (2003) and Alendorf (2007) show that the individual’s land rights within the 
household influence the outcomes of household decisions and that women’s land rights 
improve their say within the household, which leads to favorable impacts on child outcomes. 
In line with those results, our analysis shows that pre-determined inequality in de facto land 
rights across genders within a household is an important factor contributing to the household 
adoption of profitable technology.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the study’s 
experimental setting, focusing on intra-household plot management, and the survey data 
used for the empirical analysis. Section 3 develops a bargaining model with no intertemporal 
commitment to establish a conceptual framework for empirical analyses. Empirical 
specifications and key results, as well as supporting evidence for the main findings, are 
presented in Section 4. Section 5 investigates the extent to which information is shared 
among spouses. An examination of the potential mechanisms behind the observed 
inefficiency follows in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper and discusses its 
implications for the design of effective programs aimed at technology diffusion.  
 
2. Context and Experimental Design 
2.1. Experimental Context 
Our survey area is located in Masaiti District of Copperbelt Province, Zambia (see Figure 
1). People’s livelihoods depend mainly on rain-fed agriculture, and the major crops for 
cultivation are maize, cassava, sweet potato, rape, and groundnuts. This district features 
shallow wetlands, which are inundated in the rainy season and become arid by the end of 
the dry season but retain some moisture throughout it, locally referred to as “dambo”. Many 
dambo lands are left unexploited. Field interviews with local informants from 60 villages in 
2013 showed that the proportion of cultivated areas out of the dambo was below 10%. The 
main reason for this low utilization is that maize, the staple food in Zambia, is not the best 
crop to plant on dambo, and no alternative crops were suitable for growing during the rainy 
season. Taking advantage of the remaining moisture in their soils, only a few farmers grow 
vegetables (e.g., rape and tomato) on dambo during the dry season. Hence, making full use 
of unexploited dambo could create alternative income sources.  
Candidates include rice, such as New Rice for Africa (NERICA) variety, which is 
suitable for the African environment. The dissemination of rice cultivation will benefit 
people’s livelihoods in many ways since rice will provide them with a new cash-earning 
                                                 
7  Furthermore, the household-level association between land tenure security and agricultural investments is well-
documented (e.g., Deininger, Ali, and Alemu 2011; Fenske 2011; Goldstein et al. 2018). 
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opportunity and contribute to their diet. However, rice seeds for production were not 
available at local markets, and their cultivation was completely new to most local farmers.8 
We collected information about potential interest in rice production by holding group 
discussions with farmers in March 2018. We noticed that reactions differed by gender: 
Female farmers showed great interest in rice cultivation, mainly for home consumption, but 
also expressed concerns relating to milling, whereas some male farmers were concerned 
about marketing rice after the harvest since there were no rice traders (unlike for maize).  
In addition to possible gendered taste differences, intra-household inequality in 
land management rights make decision-making processes complicated in our context. In the 
survey area, land management rights are individualized, and a good number of women also 
have the authority to choose which crop to grow for agricultural plots. This is culturally 
rooted in marriage practices.9 Local communities in the survey area follow a system of 
matrilocal residence in which the husband moves to the wife’s village after the wedding. 
Her natal family will then allocate land to the daughter and her husband. The husband 
acquires only contingent rights during the uxorilocal marriage (Machina 2002). The 
important empirical consideration is that the intrahousehold allocation of management 
rights over agricultural fields is pre-determined and fixed at marriage. When investigating 
the role of this institutional factor in the adoption of a new crop, it is also important to 
understand how a husband and wife with different roles in land management interact and 
jointly make important household decisions such as adoption of new agricultural technology.  
Given the potential for spousal disagreements regarding adoption, the issue of whether 
offering an opportunity to buy rice seeds actually leads to household rice adoption is an 
important empirical question.  
With this in mind, we designed and conducted a demand experiment involving 
NERICA to quantify the actual demand for rice cultivation. To this end, 30 villages were 
chosen from among the 60 villages in which a survey had been conducted in 2013. From 
each village, we randomly selected approximately 60% of the households to form our 
sample. This sample consists of 532 agricultural households, including single female-
headed and single male-headed households.  
 
2.2. Experiments and Data 
To relax the potential constraints farm households face, we offered a small monetary 
                                                 
8 In 2013, we implemented training programs on rice production and gave NERICA rice seeds to agricultural camp 
extension officers in collaboration with the Japanese International Cooperation Agency. The training was conducted with 
officers from six different agricultural camps in Masaiti District. They were asked to conduct training sessions and 
distribute the seeds to local farmers for free. Despite this program, rice cultivation remained nonexistent in 2018 when we 
re-visited the sample communities. We found that farmers lost rice seeds due to poor harvests and could not buy more 
seeds because of the absence of rice seed markets in the survey region. As a result, rice was still a fairly new crop to our 
sample farmers at baseline. 
9 The survey data show that about 85% of household heads are Bemba, Lala, and Lamba. These ethnic groups follow a 
matrilineal lineage system, in which inheritances are passed down through the female line (Wotela 2008). 
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incentive conditional on milling rice in July/August 2018 by giving printed vouchers to 
randomly selected individuals who could obtain the cost of transportation between their 
village and Ndola, where a collaborating rice miller was located.10 Because strenuous 
manual threshing and milling are generally done by females, we expect that this treatment 
benefits women more than men by saving their energy and labor time. The voucher can be 
redeemed at the miller only for the purpose of milling rice in May 2019 (i.e., after the harvest 
season).11 Transportation costs range from K35 to K110 (USD 3 to 9), depending on the 
distance between the village and Ndola.12 To avoid any exchange of vouchers among 
villagers, we informed recipients that the voucher could be redeemed only by the person 
whose name was on the voucher or his/her spouse.13  
The voucher recipients were randomized at the household level to test the 
differential reactions to the monetary incentive by gender. Within a village, we randomly 
assigned sample households equally into (1) a treatment group of households in which 
women (wives/single female heads) received the transportation voucher (TF), (2) a group 
of households in which men (husbands/single male heads) received it (TM), and (3) a 
control group of households that did not receive a voucher (C).14 Given that female-headed 
households are common in the survey area, the sampling procedure was not restricted to 
couples. When single female-headed (single male-headed) households were assigned to the 
TM (TF) category at the first selection, such households were dropped and replaced with 
newly selected households since implementing the treatment was not feasible.   
The baseline information was collected in July/August 2018. The survey 
questionnaire consisted of two sections. The first part collected household-level information 
on demographics, production activities, consumption expenditure, and asset ownership. To 
collect the information necessary for this study, the second part of the interviews were 
conducted separately with household heads and their spouses in turn in isolation from other 
family member.15 At the very end of the interview, basic information on rice cultivation 
was explained with a brochure. Information on October rice seed sales with a price list was 
                                                 
10 As far as we know, this was the only rice miller in the study region when we conducted the experiment. 
11 The advantage of this treatment is that the transportation voucher does not affect household budget constraints at the 
time of rice seed purchase. As in Miller and Mobarak (2013), the free distribution of rice seeds might have been another 
intervention that could have detected spousal differences in demand. However, resale to neighbors would have been a 
great concern, as it could reflect demand for immediate cash rather than demand for rice cultivation. For the same reason, 
we did not introduce randomly subsidized prices. Note that our treatment is not entirely free from this issue, although some 
precautions were implemented. See Footnote 13 for further details.  
12 In 2018, USD 1 was equal to K12 (12 Zambian Kwacha). 
13 As in Jensen and Miller (2008), the resale and counterfeit of vouchers is a major concern in the experimental design. 
To prevent them, (1) the vouchers were signed by the authors in Chinese characters with highlighters, (2) the recipients 
had pictures taken so that we could validate them at redemption, and (3) the recipients were explicitly told that the vouchers 
should not be transferred to any other household.  
14 Since the randomization was done at the household level, information spillover is a concern, as it would contaminate 
the true treatment effects. However, the important information was provided to both the control and treatment households. 
The set of common information includes the location of the miller in Ndola, and thus the voucher itself does not have any 
extra information.  
15 Since treatment in a presence of the spouse can cause a different impact, as Ashraf et al. (2014) found in Zambia, we 
strictly implemented the treatment in isolation so that information about the voucher was kept private at the intervention. 
However, we did not prohibit information sharing after the intervention to make it more realistic.   
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also given to every respondent irrespective of his/her treatment category. Finally, the 
transportation voucher was provided to women (men) for TF (TM) households, and 
interviewers took photos of the respondent with the voucher.  
Although we included single male households and single female households in our 
sample, the analysis focuses on married couples since our primary interest is to understand 
intra-household decision making. Out of 532 households, the effective sample size is 384 
households after excluding 106 single female households (20%), 27 single male households 
(5%), and 15 couples with missing information on either spouse (3%). Table 1 reports the 
baseline household characteristics for the analysis sample. The average family size is 5.8, 
and only 6% of the households had experience in growing rice. In our analysis, the important 
empirical variable is the gender of plot managers in general and dambo fields in particular. 
The plot manager is defined based not on ownership but on who can make a decision 
regarding what to plant since our primary outcome is rice adoption.16 As Table 1 shows, 
39% of households own dambo fields17; wives are in charge of crop choice for dambo in 
25% of them (10% of the whole sample), while husbands are responsible for crop selection 
on dambo plots in 75% of them (29% of the sample). On the other hand, 17% of the wives 
in our sample couples can make a decision regarding crop selection on any plot.  
Table 1 shows the balance of observable household characteristics across the 
treatment arms. No statistically significant differences across the categories are detected at 
the 5% level except for the ages of the wife and husband. Since age gaps between husband 
and wife are more relevant to bargaining positions than their absolute levels, we verified 
that the age gaps were not systematically different across the treatment categories (p-value 
= 0.73). We need to control for land size and age levels for both spouses in all the regressions 
below to assure the reliability of the treatment impact estimates; Table 1 indicates that the 
randomization created fairly comparable groups.  
In October 2018, we revisited the survey villages and held rice seed sales meetings 
for two days in agricultural extension areas. Sample households were reminded of the sales 
meeting by the extension officers one week before the sales. We sold rice seeds (NERICA 
4) with a fixed price list for every customer. After the consultation with an agro-input dealer 
and extension officers, we set prices at K20 for 1 kg, K35 for 2 kg, K80 for 5 kg, and K150 
for 10 kg. For other quantities not on the list, we added K15 per 1 kg over and above the 
nearest base price. Although the sales were not restricted to the sample households, very 
few non-sample households showed up. Right after the sales, we conducted a short interview 
to collect additional data on topics such as whether they had exchanged information on rice 
cultivation, vouchers, and seed sales with spouses and friends. To those who had purchased 
seeds, we asked not only about the quantity of seeds purchased but also about whose demand 
                                                 
16 Further discussion about the definition of plot manager is provided in the next subsection.  
17 In addition to planting rice on dambo, rice can be grown in gardens with manual watering. However, where irrigation 
system is nonexistent, manual watering requires tremendous labor burdens.  
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was being met and who would mainly grow the rice.18 We followed up with households 
that did not come to the rice sales meeting and asked the same set of questions.  
Table 2 reports the unadjusted purchase rate (share of households who purchased 
seeds at our rice sales meeting), the average quantity of seeds purchased in the whole sample, 
and the conditional quantity among those who had purchased seeds by treatment arm. As 
seen in Table 2, the demand was highest in the TM group, followed by TF and C. Even after 
conditioning on purchase, the average quantity of seeds purchased was only 2 to 3 kg per 
household. This implies that their purchase was mainly for self-consumption instead of 
marketing. Since most of the households had never grown rice before, we also speculate 
that they purchased seeds for experimentation.  
To obtain information on agricultural activities during the 2018/19 rainy season, 
we collected data in May/June 2019 from 347 (90.4%) of the 384 original households. In 
this follow-up survey, enumerators collected information on agricultural production for the 
2018/19 agricultural season and gathered knowledge on rice cultivation and perceptions vis-
à-vis the role of rice (cash or food crop) from each spouse.  
 
2.3. Land Management within the Household 
Before proceeding further, it is useful to take a closer look at intra-household land 
management patterns. Many women control agricultural plots in our study area, reflecting 
the cultural practices of matrilocality discussed earlier. To quantitatively confirm land 
allocation patterns among spouses within the household, we collected information on the 
owner and main decision maker about what to grow and whether to sell harvests for each 
plot at the baseline survey.19 Since the decision making of interest is the selection of the 
new crop (i.e., rice), this study defines a wife (husband) plot as a field for which she (he) 
mainly decides what crop to grow. In other words, this study focuses on de facto plot 
managers rather than land owners. Those in charge of crop choice are usually also entitled 
to control the use of the revenue obtained from the sale of the harvested crops but also need 
to pay all relevant production costs.20 Using this definition, 99 (15%) out of 691 plots 
owned by 384 couple households were classified as fields mainly managed by the wife.  
Table 3 compares characteristics between husband- and wife-managed plots for 
married couples. As reported in other parts of rural Africa (e.g., Udry 1996), wife-managed 
plots are systematically different from husband-managed plots. For example, female plots 
are smaller by 0.7 hectares on average. More importantly, wife plots are more likely to be 
                                                 
18 Since plot managers need to pay all the input costs, it was fairly easy to identify whose demand it was in this context.  
19 Joint ownership by a couple is possible. In fact, 45% of plots were classified by the respondents as jointly owned in the 
follow-up survey in May/June 2019. However, as Doss et al. (2018) point out, joint ownership does not necessarily mean 
that management rights over the land are shared equally between the husband and wife. To capture differences in practical 
land management, we focus on the main person in charge of crop choice for agricultural field.   
20 Regarding labor sharing within the family, main crops like maize are grown by both genders in the survey area. In this 
sense, labor allocation patterns are completely different from those observed in West African countries where different 
members of the household simultaneously cultivate the same crop on different plots (e.g., Udry 1996).   
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dambo.21 This observation is important, since dambo is considered the most suitable land 
for rice production in the survey region. The other characteristics of wife-managed plots (in 
contrast to husband-managed plots) are as follows: (1) maize is planted less often in the 
2017/18 agricultural season; (2) chemical fertilizer is less heavily applied in the 2017/18 
agricultural season, which partially reflects the differences in cropping patterns between 
male and female plots; (3) wife-managed plots are more likely to be under customary land 
tenure since plots have been obtained without market or formal institutional procedures; and 
(4) land title is less likely to be given. Overall, plot characteristics and usage patterns depend 
on the gender of the plot manager within the household.   
 In addition to heterogeneity regarding the identity of the voucher recipient, we also 
consider heterogeneous treatment effects depending on who manages the dambo fields. 
Such an investigation requires that the identity of dambo managers be balanced across the 
treatment and control groups. As Table 1 shows, this is the case for our analysis sample. 
The other validity condition is that the intra-household allocation of dambo plots must not 
capture the overall power balance between spouses per se. To check this condition, the study 
compares baseline characteristics according to the gender of the dambo managers. As Table 
4 shows, wives who manage dambo are less educated and less risk-averse than are those 
with husbands who manage dambo. However, there are no significant differences between 
male and female dambo plot managers in variables related to the marital bargaining 
positions, such as financial autonomy and non-farm income. This shows that any 
heterogeneous treatment effects according to who manages the dambo will come through 
the gender division of land management rather than through gender differences in overall 
bargaining power within the couple.  
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
This section provides a conceptual framework with which to derive theoretical guidance for 
the subsequent empirical examination of the experimental data. First, we discuss what the 
standard unitary household model and Pareto-efficient collective model predict. According 
to both models, the identity of neither the voucher recipient nor the plot manager should 
affect household demand for agricultural inputs. Then, we present a bargaining model with 
endogenous outside options to understand why Pareto inefficiencies could be observed in 
agricultural production contexts. Crop choice is intrinsically an inter-temporal decision due 
to the sequential nature of agriculture: farmers decide what crop to grow before the start of 
the agricultural season and need to stick to the production plan (e.g., how many hours to be 
                                                 
21 To check this in the regression framework, Appendix Table 1 presents OLS estimation results from the empirical 
specification where the indicator variable for wife-managed plots is associated with plot characteristics. As Column 1 
shows, the likelihood of a plot being one for which the wife makes crop choice decisions increases by 8 percentage points 
if the plot is categorized as dambo relative to highland fields. The results are more striking in the specification with 
household fixed-effects (see column 2), suggesting that wives have more control over dambo in households with multiple 
plots.  
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spent on a specific activity) until harvesting time. However, achieving intertemporal 
efficiency may be difficult for several practical reasons. First, the burdens of farm activities 
tend to differ among family members. Specifically, the time costs of milling rice are incurred 
largely by wives because of their comparative advantage, while land preparation tasks 
mainly fall within the husband’s sphere. Since the timing of agricultural practices also differ, 
farmers have an incentive to deviate from an initial agreement with their spouse. Second, 
plot managers are also often in charge of selling the harvest, and their spouses are unaware 
of the exact amount of output sales. It can thus be difficult to achieve commitment to an 
efficient joint production and a previously agreed-upon division of household surplus in this 
dynamic setting. Reflecting this potential commitment problem, our model incorporates the 
possibility of a breakdown in cooperation. We assume that agricultural investments in the 
first period will affect not only household’s full income but also the marital bargaining 
position in the future period. The bargaining model with endogenized outside options 
reflects the possibility that the identity of the voucher recipient matters for the take-up of 
profitable technology depending on who controls the productive plots for rice production.   
 
3.1. Unitary Model 
The unitary household model has served as the standard approach in economics for 
analyzing household responses to policy intervention. This model treats household behavior 
as an outcome of optimization by a single decision maker. The unitary model implicitly 
hinges on two fundamental assumptions: (1) individuals’ preferences can be aggregated to 
only one set of preferences;22 and (2) all household resources—including income, family 
labor, and land—are pooled into a single common fund to which any family member has 
access without incurring any costs. Under these assumptions, the unitary model predicts that 
all that matters for program evaluation is the total amount of the benefits the household 
receives, not the identity of the targeted recipient within the household.  
In the experimental setting, what does the unitary model predict about the impact 
of our voucher treatment on the household demand for rice seed? The main mechanism 
through which our treatment affects the outcome is a reduction in time costs involving 
removing husks from rice paddy, conditional on harvested rice being brought to the 
designated rice miller.23 This would lead to an uptake of rice seeds through a relaxation of 
the participation constraints for rice cultivation if cash constraints were not binding at the 
time of purchase. In addition, if the cost function is quadratic so that time costs increase 
along with the quantity produced, the voucher would make it more profitable to purchase a 
                                                 
22 This could happen either when all the family members share the same homothetic preferences (Samuelson’s consensus 
model) or when one altruistic individual makes a positive transfer to each member of the family (Becker’s Rotten Kid 
Theorem). 
23 When not using a milling machine, farmers have to pound paddy with mortar and pestle, which takes time and may 
break grains. Having access to milling machine saves labor time and energy even for home consumption purposes. Milling 
harvested rice by machine is also crucial for selling rice at the market. 
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larger quantity of seeds and process rice harvests using milling machines at the miller than 
to obtain a small quantity of seeds and mill them manually. Overall, the voucher is likely to 
increase household demand for rice seeds on both the extensive and intensive margins if 
farm households are able to finance the upfront input costs. However, the treatment effect 
on household-level demand should not be altered by the identity of the voucher recipient 
under the unitary model in which monetary incentives are pooled in a joint budget. Thus, 
the transportation voucher should have the same effect on household demand for rice seeds 
regardless of who receives it.  
 
3.2. Pareto-efficient Collective Models 
Income pooling, an underlying assumption of the unitary model, has been challenged by 
empirical studies from both developing and developed countries (Doss 2013). In practice, 
household members make decisions collectively. Two broad types of collective model have 
been proposed in the literature on intrahousehold allocation to explicitly account for the 
sharing process within the family: One relies on cooperative solutions and the other builds 
on noncooperative solutions.  
         One branch of the former theoretical model does not assume a specific bargaining 
process by which resources are shared across different individuals within the family (e.g., 
Browning and Chiappori 1998). Given the Pareto-weight reflecting the balance of power in 
the family, the household maximizes a weighted average of utilities from the different 
family members. The other cooperative model puts some structures on the marital sharing 
rule with exogenous threat points, determined by extra-environmental parameters such as 
the sex ratios in marriage markets and alimony upon divorce (e.g., McElroy 1990). For both 
types, the common axiom embedded in the cooperative collective model is that household 
decisions are always Pareto-efficient (Donni and Chiappori 2011): There should be no 
alternative allocation that makes one person better off without making the other worse off. 
The other important assumption common to both types is that the sharing rules or marital 
bargaining powers are determined exogenously and are stationary.   
According to these cooperative collective models, the production decisions of the 
household will be independent of its consumption decisions if the relevant markets are all 
complete (Bardhan and Udry 1999). With complete markets, households simply choose the 
level of agricultural inputs to maximize profits from production. As a result, the optimal 
investment level will be expressed as a function of land characteristics and price variables. 
Because individual farm revenues are aggregated into a single pool, the identities of neither 
the transportation voucher recipient nor the plot manager will affect the agricultural 
production decisions in our experimental setting.  
However, influential papers from rural sub-Saharan Africa have reported that inputs 
are rarely allocated efficiently on the production side (Udry 1996; Duflo and Udry 2004; 
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Goldstein and Udry 2008; Haider, Smale, and Theriault 2018; Walther 2018). The absence 
of static efficiency across individual producers within the household violates a necessary 
condition for Pareto-efficient household decisions. These observations contradict not only 
the income pooling hypothesis required by the unitary model but also the assumption of 
Pareto efficiency that the cooperative collective models impose.  
A plausible rationale for the Pareto-efficiency axiom flows from the idea that 
household members interact repeatedly and thus there is no room for wasting limited 
resources according to the folk theorem. However, the literature on limited commitment has 
reported that it is difficult to commit to the original sharing rule when unpredictable shocks 
and uncertainty are salient (e.g., Mazzocco 2007). Commitment problems also arise in 
another dynamic setting where household members face different incentives and hence 
commitments to future actions become restricted (Baland and Ziparo 2017). Furthermore, 
imperfections in rural input and financial markets would make individuals unable to take 
advantage of trade opportunities, exacerbating internal inefficiency. In those cases, the sub-
optimal decisions will be chosen, rather than the first-best solution, in equilibrium. Thus, 
non-cooperative collective models that allow for Pareto-inferior results would be a better 
match for the reality faced by agricultural households in rural Africa (Doss and Quisumbing 
2019). The model developed in the next section provides a theoretical basis for the claim 
that the targeting of monetary incentives to specific individuals can result in different 
impacts in the context of agricultural technology adoption.  
 
3.3. Nash Bargaining Model with Feedback to Future Bargaining Position 
Extending the separate spheres model developed by Lundberg and Pollak (1993), we present 
a noncooperative bargaining model of a household comprising two family members with 
different incentives and resource constraints. 24  Our two-period model assumes that 
individual farm revenues determined by agricultural investments in the first period act as 
the fallback position or threat points when members negotiate over interspousal transfers in 
the second period. The rationale for within-household noncooperation is the limited 
commitment to an efficient production plan in the situation where at least one of the spouses 
has an incentive to deviate from the initial agreement (Fafchamps 2001). To incorporate this 
possibility into the setup, we introduce both the comparative advantage of males in land 
preparation activities and the comparative advantage of females in threshing and milling 
activities. Although any contributions to rice production are rewarded through inter-spousal 
transfer, the numerical example based on this model shows that the inefficient negotiation 
process within marriage can generate implications different from what the unitary model 
                                                 
24 The separate spheres bargaining model originates from the cooperative Nash bargaining model with the divorce threat 
point (Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and Horney 1981). Applications of the Lundberg and Pollak (1993) model to 
various settings are found in Carter and Katz (1997), Chen and Wooley (2001), and Slootmaker (2014).  
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and efficient collective models predict.25  
 
3.3.1. Set-up 
The household consists of a husband and a wife, denoted by m and f, who live for two 
periods: investment and negotiation stages. First, each spouse allocates their income 
endowments between the investments in rice production and first-period consumption to 
maximize their own lifetime utility. The return to the agricultural investment will be realized 
in the next period. In doing so, both spouses behave in a forward-looking way: They take 
into account how their investments increase not only the size of the household pie that will 
be allocated in the second period but also the exit option representing what each spouse 
would get if the participation constraint were binding for one of them. Due to the latter 
channel, the first-period investment will affect the final shares of the total household 
resources in the second period from which they can extract. In addition, they decide whether 
to use the transportation voucher in the future if it is available by comparing the lifetime 
utilities between when it is utilized and when it is not. We assume that the recipient needs 
to pre-commit to the decision to use the voucher, which allows the spouse of the recipient 
to utilize it even in autarchy.  
In the second negotiation stage, rice production consists of land preparation and 
milling activities. We assume that wives have a comparative advantage in milling activities, 
while husbands have a comparative advantage in land preparation. Then, the household 
jointly decides on consumption for each family member by negotiating over interspousal 
transfers. Following Lundberg and Pollak (1993), we assume that the outside options are 
determined by individual farm revenues accrued to the plot manager in within-household 
noncooperation.  
Each spouse receives utility from consumption and home leisure. The lifetime 
utility for the wife 𝑈௙ is specified as:  
𝑈௙ ൌ 𝑐ଵ௙ ൅ ln൫𝑇 െ 𝑙௙ െ ℎ௙൯ ൅ 𝑐ଶ௙ 
where 𝑐௧௜ represents the level of private consumption of sex i in period t, T is constant time 
endowment, and 𝑙௙ (ℎ௙) is time spent on land preparation (threshing and milling) by the 
wife. The lifetime utility for the husband 𝑈௠ takes a similar form:  
𝑈௠ ൌ 𝑐ଵ௠ ൅ lnሺ𝑇 െ 𝑙௠ െ ℎ௠ሻ ൅ 𝑐ଶ௠ 
We allow for neither different tastes nor altruism to reflect the roles of the endogenous 
outside option and gender inequality in access to land resources. For the same reason, we 
do not incorporate uncertainty in agricultural production.  
The illustration starts with the autarchy case, in which each spouse needs to do all 
                                                 
25 Related non-cooperative collective models that also allow for Pareto-inefficient outcomes have been developed by Basu 
(2006), Iyigun and Walsh (2007), and Walther (2018) to analyze joint household decision making such as human capital 
investments and the labor supply of children and adults. Their models explicitly assume the endogenous Pareto weights 
determined by relative spousal contributions to the household budget. The importance of relative spousal earnings in 
sharing household resources has been empirically recognized by Thomas (1990) and Hoddinott and Haddad (1995). 
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the agricultural tasks, including land preparation and milling. In autarchy, the spouses face 
first-period budget constraints, specified as  
𝑐ଵ௙ ൅ 𝑑௙𝑝𝑥ଵ௙ ൌ 𝑦ଵ௙ 
and 
𝑐ଵ௠ ൅ 𝑑௠𝑝𝑥ଵ௠ ൌ 𝑦ଵ௠ 
where 𝑑௙ (𝑑௠) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the wife (husband) manages a plot for 
rice production, p is the unit price of rice seeds, 𝑥ଵ௙  (𝑥ଵ௠ ) is the amount of rice seeds 
purchased by the wife (husband), and 𝑦ଵ௙ (𝑦ଵ௠) is income endowment given to the wife 
(husband) available in period 1. The price of a private consumption good is normalized to 1 
and is constant across the two periods for simplicity.  
 The second period budget constraints in autarchy are formatted as 
𝑐ଶ௙ ൌ 𝑦ଶ௙ ൅ 𝑑௙𝑞𝜃𝑥ଵ௙ 
and 
𝑐ଶ௠ ൌ 𝑦ଶ௠ ൅ 𝑑௠𝑞𝜃𝑥ଵ௠ 
where q stands for the output price of rice, and 𝜃 is a measure of land productivity. This 
specification indicates that there are no differences in soil quality between wife- and 
husband-managed plots.  
The utility levels in the within-household noncooperation case serve as the 
reservation utility in the negotiation among the spouses. To calculate the utility levels in 
autarchy, we impose the following assumptions on the time cost function: (1) Men are more 
productive in ploughing land than women; (2) women are more productive in threshing and 
milling than men; (3) vouchers provide a discount on milling time; and (4) the time required 
for both agricultural tasks increases proportionally along with the quantity produced. The 
times for land preparation are defined as 𝑙௙ ൌ 𝜋𝑥ଵ௙and 𝑙௠ ൌ 𝛾𝑥ଵ௠ with 𝜋 ൐ 𝛾, reflecting 
the first assumption about labor efficiency. With the last three assumptions, we specify the 
time required for threshing and milling as ℎ௙ ൌ 𝜇𝑣௙𝑥ଵ௙and ℎ௠ ൌ 𝑣௠𝑥ଵ௠ with parameters  
𝜇 ൏ 1, which represents the comparative advantage of females in milling tasks, and 𝑣 ൑ 1 
which indicates a discount on time via the transportation voucher. 𝑣 ൌ 1 represents the case 
wherein the voucher is not available. Substituting the budget constraints and the time costs 
into the lifetime utility functions produces the following utility levels from autarchy:  
𝑉௙஺ ≡ 𝑦ଵ௙ െ 𝑑௙𝑝𝑥ଵ௙ ൅ ln൫𝑇 െ 𝑑௙𝜋𝑥ଵ௙ െ 𝑑௙𝜇𝑣௙𝑥ଵ௙൯ ൅ 𝑦ଶ௙ ൅ 𝑑௙𝑞𝜃𝑥ଵ௙ 
and 
𝑉௠஺ ≡ 𝑦ଵ௠ െ 𝑑௠𝑝𝑥ଵ௠ ൅ lnሺ𝑇 െ 𝑑௠𝛾𝑥ଵ௠ െ 𝑑௠𝑣௠𝑥ଵ௠ሻ ൅ 𝑦ଶ௠ ൅ 𝑑௠𝑞𝜃𝑥ଵ௠ 
Next, we consider the case of cooperation within marriage. If the husband and wife 
agree on joint production, the household can exploit benefits from gender specialization. 
Note that the assumption of transferable utility ensures the efficient provision of public 
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goods (e.g., land preparation and milling activities in this model) in the ex post sense.26 In 
particular, the wife will do all the threshing and milling because of her comparative 
advantage, and her efforts are rewarded by inter-spousal transfers. Similarly, only the 
husband will contribute his time to land preparation.  
       Given the local contexts, we assume that the plot manager pays all the monetary 
costs for rice cultivation, except the time costs for land preparation incurred by the husband 
and those for milling incurred by the wife.27  The introduction of net wife-to-husband 
income transfer t changes the second-period budget constraint to:  
𝑐ଶ௙ ൌ 𝑦ଶ௙ ൅ 𝑑௙𝑞𝜃𝑥ଵ௙ ൅ 𝑡 
and 
𝑐ଶ௠ ൌ 𝑦ଶ௠ ൅ 𝑑௠𝑞𝜃𝑥ଵ௠ െ 𝑡 
Under this setup, the utility levels for each spouse can be written as  
𝑉௙௃ ≡ 𝑦ଵ௙ െ 𝑑௙𝑝𝑥ଵ௙ ൅ ln൫𝑇 െ 𝑑௠𝜇𝑣௙𝑥ଵ௠ െ 𝑑௙𝜇𝑣௙𝑥ଵ௙൯ ൅ 𝑦ଶ௙ ൅ 𝑑௙𝑞𝜃𝑥ଵ௙ ൅ 𝑡 
and 
𝑉௠௃ ≡ 𝑦ଵ௠ െ 𝑑௠𝑝𝑥ଵ௠ ൅ ln൫𝑇 െ 𝑑௠𝛾𝑥ଵ௠ െ 𝑑௙𝛾𝑥ଵ௙൯ ൅ 𝑦ଶ௠ ൅ 𝑑௠𝑞𝜃𝑥ଵ௠ െ 𝑡 
The wife’s time for leisure reduces to 𝑇 െ 𝑑௠𝜇𝑣௙𝑥ଵ௠ െ 𝑑௙𝜇𝑣௙𝑥ଵ௙  because she needs to 
spend her time on threshing and milling even on the husband’s plot as long as the household 
decides to produce rice. In the same way, the husband’s leisure time is expressed as 𝑇 െ
𝑑௠𝛾𝑥ଵ௠ െ 𝑑௙𝛾𝑥ଵ௙ because of his comparative advantage in land preparation. 
In the case of joint production, two spouses bargain over cash transfer t made 
between them.28 With the concept of Nash bargaining, the equilibrium values are those that 
maximize the product of the gains obtained from cooperation to the wife and husband, 
defined as the increase in utility from the threat points representing the utility that each 
spouse would achieve in autarchy. In this bargaining stage, the Nash product N is formalized 
as  
max௧ 𝑁 ≡ ሺ𝑉௙
௃ െ 𝑉௙஺ሻሺ𝑉௠௃ െ 𝑉௠஺ሻ 
where the relative weights of cooperative gains (i.e., bargaining power) are assumed to be 
symmetry. The household chooses the transfer to maximize the above Nash product N in 
this model.  
 
3.3.2. Optimization 
This model is solved through backwards induction starting from the second household 
                                                 
26 However, cooperative outcomes can be inefficient in the ex ante sense even if the bargaining succeeds because of the 
absence of spousal coordination and credible commitment. 
27 To focus on household-level demand, we do not allow for the possibility of cross-investments by each spouse. Only 
plot managers will buy rice seeds if they want.  
28 This interspousal transfer is needed for marital partnership to be maintained. In our model, interdependence operates 
through public good consumption and spousal compensation in the form of transfers.    
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bargaining stage in which, at a given level of investment in rice production (𝑥ଵ௙ and 𝑥ଵ௠) 
chosen in the first investment stage, the two spouses are negotiating over cash transfer. 
Differentiating the Nash bargaining objective function N with respect to income transfer t, 
we obtain a closed-form expression of the optimal level of spousal transfer from the husband 
m to the wife f, denoted by 𝑡∗, as a function of 𝑥ଵ௙ and 𝑥ଵ௠:  
𝑡∗ ൌ 12 ൈ ሾെ ln൫𝑇 െ ሺ𝑑
௙𝑥ଵ௙ ൅ 𝑑௠𝑥ଵ௠ሻ𝜇𝑣൯
൅ ln൫𝑇 െ 𝑑௙൫𝜇𝑣௙ ൅ 𝜋൯𝑥ଵ௙൯ ൅ ln൫𝑇 െ ሺ𝑑௙𝑥ଵ௙ ൅ 𝑑௠𝑥ଵ௠ሻ𝛾൯
െ lnሺ𝑇 െ 𝑑௠ሺ𝑣௠ ൅ 𝛾ሻ𝑥ଵ௠ሻሿ 
 Then, each spouse individually solves the first-period game by choosing the level 
of investments 𝑥ଵ௙  and 𝑥ଵ௠  taking the Nash bargaining solution transfer 𝑡∗  from the 
bargaining stage as given. The game structure depends on the identity of plot managers. The 
field data show that no household has multiple dambo fields. Thus, there is no case when 
both 𝑑௙ and 𝑑௠ take 1 for the same household. We thus consider the following three 
cases:  
 
Case 1: (𝑑௙ ൌ 1, 𝑑௠ ൌ 0), where the wife manages a suitable plot for rice  
Case 2: (𝑑௙ ൌ 0, 𝑑௠ ൌ 1), where the husband manages a suitable plot for rice  
Case 3: (𝑑௙ ൌ 0, 𝑑௠ ൌ 0), where the household does not have a suitable plot for rice 
 
 For each case, substituting 𝑡∗  back into 𝑉௙௃  and 𝑉௠௃  and then differentiating 
them with respect to 𝑥ଵ௙ and 𝑥ଵ௠ yields the spouse’s best response to the other’s action. 
Solving the system of two equations for 𝑥ଵ௙ and 𝑥ଵ௠ will generate a combination of optimal 
investment levels for both spouses in the noncooperative first stage. Finally, the recipient 
decides whether to make use of the transportation voucher in the second stage by comparing 
the lifetime utilities when it is utilized and when it is not if the voucher is available. This is 
done by substituting the optimal investment levels back into the lifetime utilities.  
Although the equilibrium levels of 𝑥ଵ௙ and 𝑥ଵ௠ cannot be analytically solved for, 
the numerical experiment in the next subsection presents examples for the case when the 
identities of both voucher recipients and plot managers matter for household rice seed 
demand. The spouses’ strategic actions are the result of optimal forward-looking behavior 
because they acknowledge that their investment choices in the first stage affect not only 
total household resources available in the future but also outside options that determine the 
marital bargaining positions. This dynamic feature, coupled with the division of tasks by 
gender, will yield sub-optimal equilibrium for some cases.  
 
3.3.3. Numerical Exercise  
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We conduct a numerical exercise to demonstrate how demand for rice seeds changes along 
with the identities of both the voucher recipients and plot managers. The parameter values 
used for this exercise are presented in Table 5. These values are chosen so that the numerical 
example reflects the reality of the study area. With these parameters, Figure 2 illustrates 
total household demand for rice seeds with various values of the parameter 𝜇 representing 
the female’s comparative advantage in threshing and milling tasks.29 As Figure 2 shows, 
the recipient always utilizes the voucher when he or she manages dambo (red and blue lines). 
As a result, demand in such households is high and relatively stable across 𝜇.  
       The purple and yellow lines in Figure 2 show household demand when the voucher 
recipient differs from the plot manager within the household. At higher values of 𝜇 (i.e., 
when the husband and wife have comparable levels of threshing productivity), the voucher 
will increase the recipient’s utility irrespective of his/her gender. As a consequence, the 
voucher given to the wife has the same impact as the voucher given to the husband. On the 
other hand, we find discrete jumps at lower values of 𝜇  (i.e., a higher comparative 
advantage of the wife in milling) when the voucher recipient is not a plot manager. This 
happens because the disutility from the improvement in the plot manager’s position 
outweighs the potential gains from the increase in total household surplus. Consequently, 
the voucher recipient prefers not to use the voucher. Thus, we should not observe any 
treatment effects in such cases.  
       Figure 2 also suggests that the responses to our treatment may be asymmetric. In the 
region of 𝜇 between 0.47 and 0.57, the treatment impact will be zero only when the husband 
receives the voucher and the wife manages the dambo (purple line). The wife’s exit option 
will improve in this case, while the husband’s bargaining position will not change after the 
use of the voucher. As a result, the husband has no incentive to exploit the voucher for fear 
of improving the wife’s future say. Combining these results, the following testable 
hypotheses can be derived:  
 
Hypothesis 1: 
(1) The voucher increases household demand for rice seeds no matter who receives it when 
the dambo manager receives the voucher 
(2) The voucher may have no impact on household demand for rice seeds when the dambo 
manager is different from the voucher recipient 
 
This behavior cannot be accounted for by the collective model with fixed outside options, 
and the current model indicates the possibility of inefficiency within the family. As Carter 
                                                 
29 Using 𝜇 ൌ 0.5 and the parameters in Table 5, Appendix Figure 1 graphically shows the combinations of utilities in 
equilibrium by voucher availability. Irrespective of the identity of the voucher recipients, the voucher improves the 
recipient’s utility when the voucher recipient and plot manager are coincided. This would not be the case when the voucher 
recipients have no control over the dambo plot. In Appendix Figure 1, the utility of the husband whose wife controls the 
dambo is higher when the voucher is not utilized.   
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and Katz (1997) point out, the impact of the voucher can be decomposed into (1) the 
reallocation effect and (2) the bargaining power effect. While the first effect is also captured 
by the unitary household model, the second effect is unique to this noncooperative 
bargaining model in the sense that the voucher given to a spouse will enhance his/her 
bargaining position in our context.30  
The possibility of no coordination in the first stage also suggests that the voucher 
recipients have no incentive to share voucher information with spouses who manage a plot 
suitable for rice production, because revealing the information would improve the spouse’s 
bargaining position in the future period. The voucher recipient’s incentives to strategically 
withhold the information can be expressed as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 2: 
When the spouse of the voucher recipient manages dambo, the voucher reduces the 
likelihood of communication about the voucher between the spouses 
 
Thus, in contrast to the unitary household model and the fully efficient collective 
model, this simple bargaining model with the endogenous outside option can provide a 
theoretical basis for the claim that the identity of the beneficiary within the household 
matters for technology adoption. These theoretical results suggest that monetary incentives 
directed to a specific individual will help improve their bargaining position within the 
couple through changes in fallback position. We test these theoretical predictions using 
experimental data drawn from the field in the next section. 
 
4. Empirical Specifications and Results 
This section exploits experimental variations in monetary incentives through the provision 
of the transportation voucher to present the intention to treat (ITT) estimates of the treatment 
effects on household demand for rice seeds. We first estimate the effect of the voucher on 
household purchase behavior on the extensive and intensive margins for the whole sample. 
Next, we also investigate whether intrahousehold land management patterns alter the take-
up of rice seeds by estimating treatment effects for each subpopulation divided by who 
controls a suitable land for rice production. Finally, evidence on related outcomes is reported 
to support the main empirical findings.   
   
4.1. Empirical Specifications 
The random assignment of treatment allows us to sidestep the standard endogeneity issues 
and estimate its impact in a relatively straightforward way. Specifically, we run the 
                                                 
30 This is unlike the assumption made in Robinson (2012), who assumes that experimental income shocks will alter neither 
the bargaining weight nor the outside option. His argument is built on the Pareto-efficient collective model developed by 
Browning and Chiappori (1998).  
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following household-level regression equations to estimate the overall impact of our 
treatment:  
𝑦௜ ൌ 𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡௜ ൅ 𝑋௜ு𝛾ு ൅ 𝑋௜௛𝛾௛ ൅ 𝑋௜௪𝛾௪ ൅ 𝜀௜ (1) 
or by separately adding treatment dummies,  
𝑦௜ ൌ 𝛽ி𝑇𝐹௜ ൅ 𝛽ெ𝑇𝑀௜ ൅ 𝑋௜ு𝛾ு ൅ 𝑋௜௛𝛾௛ ൅ 𝑋௜௪𝛾௪ ൅ 𝜀௜ (2) 
where 𝑦௜ is either the total quantity of seeds purchased by household i in kilograms or an 
indicator variable reflecting take-up by household i, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡  is an indicator for the 
households categorized as treatment, TF (TM) takes one if a married wife (husband) in 
household i received transportation voucher and zero otherwise, and 𝜀௜ is an error term. 
Because the randomized distribution of transportation vouchers ensures that the treatment 
indicators TF and TM, and 𝜀௜ are orthogonal in theory, the OLS estimates will provide us 
an unbiased estimator for the ITT effect. In this specification, the ITT effect of the voucher 
given to the wife (husband) is captured by 𝛽ி  (𝛽ெ ). 𝑋௜ு is a set of baseline household 
characteristics that may predict the take-up of rice seeds. These covariates include 
household size, total area of land owned, and total value of household assets such as 
livestock and durables. To capture information constraints, the indicator variable for 
previous experience in rice cultivation is also included in a vector of household 
characteristics. Finally, as the survey villages were spread across five agricultural extension 
camps, we include camp fixed effects.31    
𝑋௜௛ is a set of pre-treatment characteristics of the husband in household i, while 
𝑋௜௪ is the exact same set of controls but for the wife in household i. In particular, we assess 
whether household demand is the same between the households where the wife manages 
dambo and those where the husband does so. To control for other important gender 
differences in preferences and resource constraints, we separately include both spouses’ 
ages, education levels, an index for financial autonomy,32 annual non-farm income, and risk 
preference parameters, in line with the methodology of Binswanger (1980; see the footnote 
of Table 1 for more details on the index for financial autonomy and risk parameters).  
We test whether 𝛽ி ൌ 𝛽ெ holds to evaluate the income-pooling assumption of the 
unitary household model. Since land transactions are inactive in the survey area, current 
access to productive lands for rice cultivation (i.e., dambo) is a critical condition for taking 
up rice seeds. The theoretical model in Section 3.3 predicts that the impact of the 
transportation voucher holder depends on who manages the dambo plots within the 
household. By including the interaction terms between our treatment and the identity of the 
                                                 
31 Although our randomization was stratified by village, we add only five camp fixed effects to circumvent the reduction 
in degrees of freedom. Note that point estimates should be the same even if stratification is ignored, since we set equal 
proportions of treatment and control households within strata at randomization.  
32 As in Heath and Tan (forthcoming), a higher bargaining power reflecting a better outside option allows the member to 
extract a higher payoff from the household bargaining process. On the other hand, the individual with higher autonomy 
may have more control over household resources such as income. Thus, our index for financial autonomy would partially 
reflect the bargaining positions within the household but would not completely capture the sharing rule per se. Table 4 
shows that this financial autonomy index is not correlated with the identity of dambo managers; thus, these capture different 
aspects of marital bargaining positions.  
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dambo plot manager, we also examine if the equality of βF and βM holds for each 
subpopulation classified based on who has the authority to select what to grow on dambo 
within the couple.   
Since statistical inferences based on conventional robust covariance estimates rely 
on asymptotic properties, they have a risk of force discoveries for average treatment effects 
if there are a few available observations in sub-group analyses (Young 2019). In our case, 
the effective size of the analysis sample is small for households in which the wife manages 
the dambo. To address this issue, we also report the results from hypothesis tests based on 
bootstrapping and randomization inference (Heß 2017).    
 
4.2. Main Results   
Table 6 reports the regression results of Equations (1) and (2). Column 1 shows that the 
treatment households who had received the transportation voucher purchased an additional 
0.46 kg of rice seeds relative to control households. Given that the average purchase amount 
among control households is 0.58 kg, the voucher has a significant impact on the household 
demand for rice seeds among local farmers with little prior experience in its cultivation. The 
treatment impact is also derived on the extensive margin in column 4, though the detected 
statistical significance level is marginal.33 
 We next assess whether the gender of dambo field managers matters in household 
purchase behavior. The results indicate that households in which the husband manages the 
dambo are more likely to buy seeds than are households where the wife chooses which crop 
to grow on dambo, and the hypothesis testing (the resultant p-values shown in the 7th row 
from the bottom of Table 6) regarding the equality of these two coefficients reveals 
statistically significant differences. When the husband decides what to grow on the dambo 
plot, households are more likely (all else being equal) to adopt rice by about 20 percentage 
points relative to households where the wife controls the dambo (with a difference in 
coefficients of 0.128- [-0.076] in column 4). However, this inferred relationship should not 
be interpreted as a causal one because these two kinds of households might systematically 
differ in unobserved ways. For instance, husbands may be more likely to take on 
responsibility for crop choice on dambo fields if they are interested in crop production for 
market sales rather than for consumption purposes.  
If the husband’s preference is more reflected in observed household behavior than 
the wife’s (or vice versa), we should see significant differences in estimated coefficients 
between the spousal characteristics. Table 6 shows that the wife’s characteristics per se have 
an explanatory power for household demand for rice seeds. Specifically, one of the robust 
                                                 
33 One potential explanation for the non-significance results for binary purchase decisions might be that bringing harvests 
to town for milling is relatively costly when production is small-scale (e.g., planting only 1 kg for home consumption). 
The voucher would be more appealing to farmers who are willing to plant rice at a certain scale. In fact, Appendix Table 
2 confirms that the voucher significantly affects the binary decision to purchase more than or equal to 2 kg of seeds. This 
empirical observation is in line with the idea that production costs increase along with quantity.  
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findings across all the specifications is that the wife’s financial autonomy has a negative 
impact. A possible explanation for this finding is that, since rice is locally available for 
consumption even within a survey village and rice production incurs time costs for females, 
wives with a degree of financial autonomy have no incentives to plant rice. Furthermore, 
keeping the wife’s age constant, an additional year in the husband’s age increases the 
probability of household take-up by 1.2 percentage points, and the estimated impact is 
significantly different from that of the wife’s age. These results suggest the importance of 
taking into account not only the household head’s characteristics but also his/her spouse’s 
characteristics in explaining technology adoption. This finding is consistent with results in 
the small but growing literature on heterogeneous preferences within households (Miller 
and Mobarak 2013; Magnan et al. 2019).  
Our primary interest is to test whether the identity of the voucher recipient matters 
for technology adoption decisions. Column (2) in Table 6 shows the estimation results from 
a specification adding TF and TM treatment dummies separately. We find no evidence that 
the voucher holder has different impacts on the quantity of rice seeds purchased, indicating 
that the resource pooling assumption of the unitary household model is not rejected at first 
glance. The result does not change even when we run the Tobit model to take into account 
the fact that a significant number of households ended up with no purchase (see column 3). 
Even in the extensive margin, we find no evidence that the impacts of TF and TM on 
household demand are different (see columns 5 and 6). This result is not surprising, since 
these null results are based on the full sample, which consists of households with land 
suitable for rice as well as those without at the time of the sales meeting. Our theoretical 
framework posits that the voucher recipient’s gender has an impact when the wife or 
husband controls land resources relevant to the technology in question. To understand the 
role of intrahousehold decision making in technology adoption, we thus need to test the 
equality of impacts between the vouchers given to the wife and husband separately 
according to the identity of the person who controls the dambo fields.  
We do so by estimating heterogeneous ITT effects by incorporating the interaction 
terms between the voucher treatment dummies and the variables indicating the dambo 
manager’s gender into the empirical specification of Equation (2). Appendix Table 3 reports 
the full estimation and hypothesis testing results based on bootstrapping and randomization 
inference methods as well as conventional robust standard errors. Based on the estimation 
results reported in Appendix Table 3, Figure 3 summarizes the treatment impacts by 
household category based on the identities of the dambo plot managers and voucher 
recipients. There are four key findings. First, if the wife controls a dambo field, the voucher 
given to her (rather than her husband) induces higher household demand, and the impacts 
are different at the 5% statistical level at both the intensive and extensive margins 
(household categories [1] and [2]). By contrast, when the husband selects what to grow on 
24 
 
a dambo plot, the voucher increases household demand regardless of the identity of the 
voucher receiver (household categories [3] and [4]). Second, vouchers given to the wife 
increase household demand regardless of the identity of the dambo plot manager. Third, 
vouchers given to husbands increase demand only when they select what to grow for dambo 
fields while it decreases the demand when their wives manage the dambo plot. Finally, for 
households owing no dambo fields at baseline, take-up rates are higher when the voucher is 
given to the husband than when it is given to the wife (see row “H0: TF = TM (p-value)” of 
Appendix Table 3).34  
To sum up, Figure 3 and Appendix Table 3 show that (1) when households have 
no dambo at the baseline survey, vouchers given to husbands induce more rice demand on 
the extensive margin than do vouchers given to wives, and (2) if the wife chooses what to 
cultivate on the dambo, the vouchers given to wives have greater impacts on household 
demand for rice seeds than those given to husbands. These empirical findings that the 
identity of the voucher recipients matters indicate that monetary transfers generated by the 
voucher is not pooled into a single budget within the marriage. Figure 3 also reports 
interesting evidence that (3) the voucher given to husbands is effective only when they 
control the dambo fields. This suggest that households’ productive resources relevant to 
agricultural technology are also not pooled within the household. The observed significant 
differences in household demand for the new crop between the treatment assignments and 
the intrahousehold land management patterns are hard to reconcile with the standard unitary 
household model and Pareto-efficient collective models, both of which predict that their 
identities should not matter for agricultural production decisions. Rather, these observations 
are more consistent with the household bargaining model that allows for Pareto-inferior 
outcomes. In particular, the negative impact of the voucher given to husbands when their 
wives control dambo implies the presence of tensions between spouses.  
 
4.3. Treatment Effects on Spousal Demands 
Individual-level results of our treatment would provide more direct evidence on the role of 
intrahousehold bargaining in technology adoption. In addition to the total purchase amount 
of rice seeds at the household level, we asked respondents whose demand was being met 
and the quantity of seeds demanded by each spouse. Such self-reported information allows 
us to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects on each spousal rice demand separately by 
treatment status and intra-household land management pattern. If spouses have different 
motivations to adopt rice, we expect that reactions to monetary incentives will also be 
different, as proposed by our theoretical model.   
                                                 
34 These households have to look for agricultural land with enough moisture in its soil for rice planting before the onset 
of the rainy season or need to pay more labor costs for cultivation (e.g., manual watering on a normal field) during the 
crop season. The results may imply that only husbands, who usually have more control over normal fields, can make such 
an arrangement (and thus a decision) to start producing rice in the setting where land markets are not active.  
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Figure 4 presents the estimated treatment impacts for the wife’s and husband’s 
demand by household category.35 As shown in Figure 4, the wife shows higher interest in 
rice seeds for production when she receives the transportation voucher (household 
categories [1] and [3] vs. [2] and [4] in Figure). In addition to the comparison between 
household categories [1] and [2], the difference in the wife’s demand is significant between 
household categories [3] and [4]. Unlike the wife’s responses, the husband’s demand does 
not react significantly to the transportation voucher when his spouse controls a dambo plot. 
Thus, the identity of the voucher recipient has an impact on the wife’s demand but not on 
the husband’s.  
Another important finding is that the positive impacts on total household demand 
come mostly from the high demand of the voucher recipient when he or she also controls 
dambo. When the wife is a dambo plot manager, the transportation voucher given to her has 
a greater impact on the fraction of the wives who showed interest in rice production than 
that given to husbands by 36 percentage points (0.271– [-0.094]; see column 3 of Appendix 
Table 4, row H0: [1] = [2]). Moreover, the demand of the husband is higher at the intensive 
margin than that of the wife when he receives the voucher and manages dambo. In the 
hypothesis tests across the regression models, these two different responses by the wife and 
husband were found to be statistically significant at the 10% level (not reported). This result 
is consistent with the non-cooperative bargaining model with endogenous outside option: 
The dambo manager who receives the voucher has a strong incentive to produce rice, since 
it will improve his or her future bargaining position within the marriage. On the flip side, 
when the voucher recipient is a different person from the dambo manager, the responses to 
the treatment look similar between the spouses. This may indicate that such households 
purchase rice seeds only if the husband and wife reach an agreement over rice production. 
Thus, similar responses among spouses can be a sign of cooperation within the household. 
Overall, the analysis with individual-level demand data finds results consistent with the idea 
that household technology adoption is an outcome of intrahousehold bargaining.36  
 
4.4. Additional Evidence   
We have so far presented evidence that observed rice demand reflects not only the patterns 
of voucher distributions within the household but also those of intrahousehold land 
management. These findings suggest the presence of inefficiency. This subsection presents 
supporting evidence for the main results.  
 
                                                 
35 Full estimation results are reported in Appendix Table 4.  
36 We also asked respondents which spouse had wanted rice directly. Appendix Figure 2 reports heterogeneous treatment 
impact estimates on the answer to this direct question (Full results are found in Appendix Table 5). The results show that 
the identity of the voucher recipient matters for the preferences of both spouses when wives manage control the dambo. 
However, there are two caveats for this auxiliary exercise. First, this direct question was asked only to purchase households, 
and the estimates are based on a small sample. Second, the estimates may suffer from sample selection bias.  
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4.4.1. Gender of Customers and Production Plan 
Another interesting issue is the identity of those who came to the rice seed sales meetings 
that we organized in each survey village. In our experimental design, the voucher 
distribution was implemented privately, while both spouses received the same information 
on the sales meetings (i.e., on when and where it was happening). Since opportunity costs 
for showing up at the venue may differ between males and females, it would make sense if 
we observed that, for example, the wives were more likely to come. However, the identity 
of the recipient cannot be a determinant of who showed up to buy seeds unless the recipients 
revealed higher demand than non-recipients from the same household. As a related outcome, 
we will also use self-reported answers to the question “Who would mainly cultivate rice?” 
as the other outcome variable. This question was asked at the sales meeting.    
Figure 5 graphically summarizes the reduced-form results for each household 
category.37 The left panel in Figure 5 shows the treatment impacts of the voucher on the 
probability of the wife (husband) coming to our sales meeting in red (blue). The results show 
that, when the wife controls the dambo, the wife’s receipt of the voucher increases the 
likelihood of the wife showing up at the meeting. This is also true for the sample households 
in which the husband manages the dambo. In addition, the husband who receives the 
voucher is less likely to come when his spouse manages the dambo than when he controls 
the dambo. In this case, husbands seem to show no interest in the purchase, probably because 
they cannot reap benefits from rice production due to their lack of control over the 
agricultural plots.     
The other outcome is the answer to the question about who would cultivate rice 
according to the respondent’s initial plan. The estimation results are illustrated in the right-
hand panel of Figure 5. In line with the previous argument, wives who control the dambo 
are more likely to be involved in rice production when they receive the voucher than they 
are when their husbands receive it. Furthermore, the propensity of husbands to participate 
in rice cultivation depends both on who gets the voucher and who manages the dambo.   
In summary, both panels show non-random patterns depending on the identities of 
the voucher recipients and dambo managers. The additional evidence presented here is 
consistent with the main finding that the identity of the voucher recipients matters for 
household technology adoption, especially when wives manage the lands most suitable for 
rice cultivation. In this case, husbands from TF households are less likely to show up on the 
rice sales day than are husbands from TM households. Similarly, wives from TF households 
are more involved in rice production during the upcoming rainy season than are wives from 
TM households. Overall, the empirical evidence supports the key predictions of our 
theoretical model, indicating that spouses face different incentives.  
                                                 
37 Full estimation results are presented in Appendix Table 6. Because there were only 12 cases (out of 126 purchase 
households) in which both spouses showed up, we simply create dummy variables taking 1 if each spouse came and use 
them separately as dependent variables.   
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4.4.2. Comparison with Single Female-headed Households 
We also check whether intrahousehold bargaining plays a significant role in technology 
adoption decisions by comparing the impacts of transportation vouchers given to the wife 
in a married couple with those of transportation vouchers given to the female heads of the 
household. The motivating hypothesis is that, because the female heads are free from 
intrahousehold bargaining, they may simply choose optimal investment levels to maximize 
profits. By contrast, as shown in the theoretical model, married wives who can choose what 
to grow on dambo have an incentive to overinvest in rice seeds to improve their future 
bargaining positions. Thus, the voucher given to wives in couple households should have a 
greater impact on technology take-up if intrahousehold bargaining plays a key role in 
household investment decisions.  
To test this hypothesis, we add 106 observations from single female households 
and drop TM households since single female households cannot be considered part of the 
TM category according to our sampling rule. We control for the individual characteristics 
of females, either wife or female head. Specifically, a set of explanatory variables in the 
regression equation includes age, years of education, non-farm income, and risk preferences, 
but not financial autonomy since that variable was not elicited from the single female 
household heads. Figure 6 presents the estimation results in which the reference category is 
couple households in the control group that own no dambo fields.38 The voucher given to 
female spouses in married couples increases participation in rice production when they 
manage dambo fields. Contrariwise, the voucher given to single females has no impact on 
demand for rice seeds. The difference in the response to our treatment between the two 
household types is significantly different, though the hypothesis test based on randomization 
inference suggests a marginal result. The availability of family labor is more likely to be in 
short supply in female headed households than in couple households, which may account 
for the null effect of our treatment. Although the analysis here is descriptive, this result is 
consistent with the prediction that female spouses have an extra incentive to invest in their 
own fields to enhance their bargaining position within the household.   
 
5. Information Sharing within the Household 
This section investigates the role of household bargaining in technology take-up from a 
different angle. If information flows within the marriage are not perfect, this can be a direct 
source of inefficiencies.39 Our bargaining model predicts that information asymmetries 
between spouses can be interpreted as an outcome of their strategic behavior (hypothesis 2). 
                                                 
38 Refer to Appendix Table 7 for the full estimation results. 
39 Some studies have reported the presence of misinformation among spouses and strong incentives to conceal resources 
such as income from other family members (e.g., Anderson and Baland 2002; Ashraf 2009). These suggest that individuals 
are often willing to pay additional costs to keep information private. Such asymmetric information problems automatically 
lead to Pareto-inefficient outcomes, since there is room for an increase in household total surplus through information 
sharing between husband and wife. 
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In our experimental context, recipients may not share information on transportation 
vouchers with their spouses for (un)intended purposes, even though we did not prohibit such 
information sharing.40   
       To directly test hypothesis 2 postulated in Section 3, we utilize the survey data on 
spousal communication about the voucher. The results are presented in Figure 7 (left-hand 
panel).41 We found a striking pattern regarding spousal communication about vouchers. If 
the dambo manager receives the transportation voucher, most talk about them to their 
spouses before the rice sales. When the voucher recipient is different from the dambo 
manager within the household, however, the likelihood of spousal communication falls by 
about 15 percentage points. This interesting result is consistent with the idea that voucher 
recipients have less incentive to share information if they have no authority to select the 
crops for dambo fields, since their bargaining positions will not improve through rice 
cultivation. As shown in the right-hand panel of Figure 7, we asked the respondents if they 
had talked about rice cultivation with his/her spouse and found no evidence that the voucher 
encouraged spousal communication about rice production in general. These results suggest 
that spouses have an incentive to hide useful resources when the voucher does not improve 
their allocations, which can increase the household’s total surplus. 
 
6. Mechanisms behind Inefficient Production Choices 
6.1. Limited Commitment  
The previous sections indicate the importance of intrahousehold bargaining in the context 
of technology adoption. Since the gender division of labor makes it difficult to satisfy 
incentive compatibility faced by at least one of the spouses, household members cannot 
make an enforceable contract regarding future actions with their spouses and choose the 
first-best production plan. The theoretical framework in Section 3 illustrates the possibility 
of selecting the suboptimal choice as household equilibrium because of this commitment 
problem. The empirical results in Sections 4 and 5 are coherent with the prediction of the 
bargaining model with no intertemporal commitment.  
Although it is hard to present direct evidence on the difficulty of commitment 
among spouses, the follow-up data on how many households who purchased rice seeds 
actually grow rice provide suggestive evidence on limited commitment to future production 
plans. Our survey collected information on agricultural activities, including rice production, 
during the 2018/19 rainy season in June 2019. Interestingly, out of 119 households who 
purchased seeds in October 2018, only 28 households actually cultivated rice.42 This may 
                                                 
40 Appendix Table 8 confirms the lack of significant differences between genders and dambo plot managers in term of the 
probability of acknowledging the rule of voucher usage (i.e., wherein spouses, in addition to voucher recipients, can redeem 
the voucher).  
41 See Appendix Table 9 for the full estimation results.  
42 The most common reasons for not conducting rice planting were that (1) they did not know how to grow rice and (2) 
they were busy planting other crops like maize.  
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be because new information obtained after the seed sales meeting forced the households to 
revise their initial production plan. If the future plan was fully committed to and if 
information shocks are purely random, however, we should not observe different patterns 
in the likelihood of actual rice cultivation across household categories defined by treatment 
assignment and land management pattern.   
To test this conjecture, we regress the dummy variable reflecting actual rice 
planting on the identities of the voucher recipients and dambo managers. To deal with a 
small number of “success” observations with actual planting, treatment households are 
categorized into matched households (i.e., wherein the voucher recipient and the dambo 
manager are matched) and unmatched households. Because planting follows rice seed 
purchase, it would be ideal to model the sample selection in the regression framework. In 
particular, the sample selection equation should have exogenous variables that generate 
changes in the likelihood that the household will decide to purchase rice seeds but do not 
affect the likelihood of planting. Unfortunately, such variables are not available. Instead, we 
present simple OLS estimation results for the full sample and the sample comprising only 
purchase households. These provide us the lower bound of estimates if the households in 
which the spouses find it difficult to commit to a production plan are less likely to purchase 
rice seeds.  
Table 7 shows the estimated impacts on the likelihood of rice planting during the 
2018/19 agricultural season. The results show that our sample households are more likely 
to plant rice, especially when the voucher recipient manages dambo fields.43 The equality 
in the coefficients between the matched and unmatched households is rejected at the 5% 
level for the restricted sample. These conservative estimates provide evidence that the 
difficulty in intertemporal commitment among spouses is a key mechanism behind the 
observed non-random patterns of household demand for rice seeds.  
 
6.2. Alternative Explanations 
As illustrated in Figure 4, one of our main results is that the favorable impacts of our voucher 
can be explained solely by the high interest of the plot manager who also received the 
voucher. In this case, the effects of the voucher did not spill over onto their spouses’ demand. 
One may argue that this difference in the responses to our treatment between spouses flows 
not from differences in incentives reflected by the gender division of labor but from other 
gender differences, such as in knowledge of rice cultivation and perceptions about rice. To 
                                                 
43 Appendix Figure 3 also confirms the non-random patterns of rice planting across the four household categories, 
although the statistical levels are not high due to the small sample size. The empirical results reveal that (1) TF households 
are more likely to grow rice than TM households when the wife controls the dambo and that (2) the voucher given to the 
husband increases the probability that rice will actually be planted when he chooses what to grow on the dambo relative 
to when his wife does so. Both results are consistent with the observed patterns for the effect of these identities on 
household demand for rice seeds as shown in Figure 3. In particular, committing to a production plan was found to be most 
difficult when the husband received the voucher and the wife managed the dambo plot.  
 
30 
 
answer this question, we investigate the spousal difference patterns in these two factors.  
 
6.2.1. Gender Differences in Knowledge of Rice Cultivation 
Before the study’s intervention, rice production was new to most of the local farmers. Our 
enumerators provided information on rice cultivation techniques via a brochure to both the 
treatment and control households and to both spouses in the baseline survey. Nevertheless, 
gender differences in knowledge might help explain the differences in rice demand between 
the spouses. To address this possibility, we asked five questions during the follow-up survey 
in May/June 2019. As a measure of knowledge about rice cultivation, we calculate a 
knowledge score that aggregates together the correct answers to the five questions.44 Figure 
8 reports the treatment effects on the knowledge score according to the identity of the 
recipients interacted with the gender of the dambo plot managers. We find no significant 
differences in knowledge scores between the spouses across the four household categories, 
which rules out this channel. Instead, the order of the household-level average score is 
highest in group 1 (TF when the wife manages the dambo) and is lowest in group 2 (TM 
when the wife manages the dambo), the same as the observed pattern of total household 
demand shown in Figure 3. Thus, knowledge about rice cultivation as measured here may 
reflect individuals’ efforts to acquire knowledge on how to grow rice after its purchase. 
 
6.2.2. Gender Differences in Perceptions of Rice  
Cultural distinctions between female and male crops are often observed in the African 
context, though the typical categorization does not often fit the reality (Doss 2002). This 
concept is associated with the distinction between crops for market sales (cash crops) and 
crops for home consumption (food crops). The general observation is that cash crops are 
mainly a male task domain, while food crops are a female domain. In addition, the literature 
points out that the distinctions between men’s and women’s crops are affected by changes 
in the environment and crop profitability (von Braun and Webb 1989; Fischer and Qaim 
2012; Carney and Carney 2018). In our context, the pattern of intrahousehold land 
management might reflect spousal differences in perceptions about rice whereby women 
may consider rice as a food crop while men may think of it as a cash crop. In addition, our 
treatment could alter the status-quo perceptions of rice among the survey farmers since the 
treatment households are encouraged to bring harvested rice to the town for milling. Selling 
rice at market requires one to mill the rice using a milling machine because doing so 
manually using a mortar can result in grain breakage, leading to poor-quality rice. 
                                                 
44 Knowledge scores are based on the responses to questions in the follow-up survey. To validate our empirical exercise, 
we need to assume no gender differences in knowledge before the intervention. To test this assumption, we regress the 
knowledge score on a gender dummy variable interacted with the management status of dambo with another sample of 
households from neighboring villages. In these villages, no one received the voucher or any information on rice production 
and the sales meeting. The estimation results shown in Appendix Table 11 confirm that there were no significant knowledge 
gaps between the sexes.  
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Accordingly, the initial perception of rice as a food crop might have changed to a perception 
of it as a cash crop after the vouchers were received. This change would generate the 
observed patterns of spousal demand and hence of total household demand.  
Figure 9 summarizes the ITT estimates from regressing a dummy variable taking 
unity if the respondent agreed to the statement that “Rice is a cash crop” on the treatment 
dummies and its interaction terms with the identity of the dambo manager. Perceptions were 
elicited in the follow-up survey in May/June 2019.45 Because we detect no significant gap 
among spouses about perceptions of rice as a cash crop in the first and fourth categories, it 
is reasonable to conclude that gender differences in such perceptions did not drive the 
pattern of household demand for rice seeds. Figure 10 shows the treatment impacts when 
we regress a dummy variable taking 1 if respondents considered rice as a male crop or 
female crop. The results show that wives (husbands) are more likely than husbands (wives) 
to consider rice as a female (male) crop irrespective of the treatment and land management 
category. Thus, we find no evidence that any differences in perceptions between spouses 
drive our main results.    
Overall, gender differences in both knowledge of rice cultivation and perceptions 
do not explain the observed patterns of spousal differences in demand for rice seeds.   
 
7. Conclusions 
This study exploits experimental variations in the gender specific targeting of monetary 
incentives intended to enhance the adoption of a new crop to understand the role of 
intrahousehold bargaining in technology adoption. We find that the impact of transportation 
vouchers, which are expected to benefit more female than male farmers, on household 
demand for rice seeds differs according to the identity of the voucher recipient and plot 
manager. The vouchers given to the husbands increase household demand for rice seeds 
only when they manage a field suitable for rice production. When the wives choose what to 
grow in such fields, the impact of the voucher given to the wives is significantly different 
from that given to the husbands. The differential impacts on technology take-up when the 
identity of the targeted individuals is different are consistent neither with the standard 
unitary household model nor with the cooperative collective model with exogenous outside 
options. Rather, a full set of empirical results is well-explained by a noncooperative 
bargaining model with feedback to future bargaining positions.  
Evidence that productive resources are poorly pooled within the household 
indicates the presence of productive inefficiency. For the efficient use of productive 
resources, it would be desirable to identify who manages the resources critical for adopting 
                                                 
45 Perceptions were elicited after the harvesting season in the 2018/19 agricultural year. To test whether changes in 
perceptions caused by the receipt of the voucher affected household demand for rice seeds at the time of purchase in 
October 2018, we hypothesize here that they were constant until the time of the follow-up survey when we collected the 
information. Although the perceived role of rice might have changed, the small number of households that actually planted 
rice would mitigate this concern. In fact, the inclusion of the dummy for the actual rice cultivation did not change results.  
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the technology of interest and to design interventions effectively targeted to those who 
manage the resource, rather than to household heads, as is commonly done. As Haider, 
Smale, and Theriault (2018) have pointed out, however, such individual targeting is not 
implemented in the current agricultural programs aimed at technology diffusion. Lastly, a 
growing literature is investigating who is the best seed person for technology diffusion (e.g., 
Beaman et al. 2018). It would be worthwhile evaluating the relative importance of targeting 
across households and targeting within households in the context of technology adoption.  
 
  
33 
 
References 
Allendorf, K. (2007). Do Women’s Land Rights Promote Empowerment and Child Health 
in Nepal?. World Development, 35(11), 1975-1988. 
Alderman, H., Chiappori, P. A., Haddad, L., Hoddinott, J., & Kanbur, R. (1995). Unitary 
versus Collective Models of the Household: is it Time to Shift the Burden of Proof?. 
World Bank Research Observer, 10(1), 1-19. 
Anderson, S., & Baland, J. M. (2002). The Economics of Roscas and Intrahousehold 
Resource Allocation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(3), 963-995. 
Ashraf, N. (2009). Spousal Control and Intra-household Decision Making: An Experimental 
Study in the Philippines. American Economic Review, 99(4), 1245-77. 
Ashraf, N., Field, E., & Lee, J. (2014). Household Bargaining and Excess Fertility: An 
Experimental Study in Zambia. American Economic Review, 104(7), 2210-37. 
Bardhan, P., & Udry, C. (1999). Development Microeconomics. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford.  
Bageant, E. R., & Barrett, C. B. (2017). Are There Gender Differences in Demand for Index-
Based Livestock Insurance?. Journal of Development Studies, 53(6), 932-952. 
Baland, J. M., & Ziparo, R. (2017). Intra-household Bargaining in Poor Countries. in 
Towards Gender Equity in Development, 69-96. 
Basu, K. (2006). Gender and Say: A Model of Household Behaviour with Endogenously 
Determined Balance of Power. Economic Journal, 116(511), 558-580. 
Beaman, L., Karlan, D., Thuysbaert, B., & Udry, C. (2015). Selection into Credit Markets: 
Evidence from Agriculture in Mali. Mimeo 
Beaman, L., BenYishay, A., Magruder, J., & Mobarak, A. M. (2018). Can Network Theory-
Based Targeting Increase Technology Adoption? (No. w24912). National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
Binswanger, H. P. (1980). Attitudes toward Risk: Experimental Measurement in Rural India. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 62(3), 395-407. 
Browning, M., & Chiappori, P. A. (1998). Efficient Intra-household Allocations: A General 
Characterization and Empirical Tests. Econometrica, 66(6), 1241-1278. 
Bryan, G., Chowdhury, S., & Mobarak, A. M. (2014). Underinvestment in a Profitable 
Technology: The Case of Seasonal Migration in Bangladesh. Econometrica, 82(5), 
1671-1748. 
Carney, C., & Carney, M. H. (2018). Impact of Soil Conservation Adoption on Intra‐
Household Allocations in Zambia. Review of Development Economics, 22(4), 1390-
1408. 
Carter, M. R. & Katz, E. (1997) Separate Spheres and the Conjugal Contract: Understanding 
the Impact of Gender-based Development. in Intrahousehold resource allocation in 
developing countries: Methods, models, and policy.  
34 
 
Carter, M. R., Laajaj, R., & Yang, D. (2013). The Impact of Voucher Coupons on the Uptake 
of Fertilizer and Improved Seeds: Evidence from a Randomized Trial in 
Mozambique. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 95(5), 1345-1351. 
Chen, Z., & Woolley, F. (2001). A Cournot–Nash Model of Family Decision Making.  
Economic Journal, 111(474), 722-748. 
Deininger, K., Ali, D. A., & Alemu, T. (2011). Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure 
Security, Investment, and Land Market Participation: Evidence from Ethiopia. Land 
Economics, 87(2), 312-334. 
Dercon, S., & Krishnan, P. (2000). In Sickness and in Health: Risk Sharing within 
Households in Rural Ethiopia. Journal of Political Economy, 108(4), 688-727. 
Dillon, B., & Voena, A. (2018). Widows' Land Rights and Agricultural Investment. Journal 
of Development Economics, 135, 449-460. 
Donni, O., & Chiappori, P. A. (2011). Nonunitary Models of Household Behavior: a Survey 
of the Literature. In Household Economic Behaviors (pp. 1-40). Springer, New York, 
NY. 
Doepke, M., & Tertilt, M. (2019). Does Female Empowerment Promote Economic 
Development? Journal of Economic Growth, forthcoming.  
Doss, C. (2002). Men’s Crops? Women’s Crops? The Gender Patterns of Cropping in Ghana. 
World Development, 30(11), 1987-2000. 
Doss, C. (2013). Intrahousehold Bargaining and Resource Allocation in Developing 
Countries. World Bank Research Observer, 28(1), 52-78. 
Doss, C., Kovarik, C., Peterman, A., Quisumbing, A., & van den Bold, M. (2015). Gender 
Inequalities in Ownership and Control of Land in Africa: Myth and Reality. 
Agricultural Economics, 46(3), 403-434. 
Doss, C., Meinzen-Dick, R., Quisumbing, A., & Theis, S. (2018). Women in Agriculture: 
Four myths. Global food security, 16, 69-74. 
Doss, C. R., & Quisumbing, A. R. (2019). Understanding Rural Household Behavior: 
Beyond Boserup and Becker. Agricultural Economics. 
Duflo, E. (2003). Grandmothers and Granddaughters: Old‐age Pensions and Intrahousehold 
Allocation in South Africa.  World Bank Economic Review, 17(1), 1-25.  
Duflo, E., & Udry, C. (2004). Intrahousehold Resource Allocation in Cote d'Ivoire: Social 
Norms, Separate Accounts and Consumption Choices (No. w10498). National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 
Emerick, K., de Janvry, A., Sadoulet, E., & Dar, M. H. (2016). Technological Innovations, 
Downside Risk, and the Modernization of Agriculture. American Economic Review, 
106(6), 1537-61. 
Emerick, K. & Dar, M. H. (2019). Farmer Field Days and Demonstrator Selection for 
Increasing Technology Adoption. Mimeo. 
35 
 
Fafchamps, M. (2001). Intrahousehold Access to Land and Sources of Inefficiency: Theory 
and Concepts. Access to Land, Rural Poverty and Public Action, 68-96. 
Fenske, J. (2011). Land Tenure and Investment Incentives: Evidence from West Africa. 
Journal of Development Economics, 95(2), 137-156. 
Fischer, E., & Qaim, M. (2012). Gender, Agricultural Commercialization, and Collective 
action in Kenya. Food Security, 4(3), 441-453. 
Goldstein, M., & Udry, C. (2008). The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural 
Investment in Ghana. Journal of Political Economy, 116(6), 981-1022. 
Goldstein, M., Houngbedji, K., Kondylis, F., O'Sullivan, M., & Selod, H. (2018). 
Formalization without Certification? Experimental Evidence on Property Rights and 
Investment. Journal of Development Economics, 132, 57-74. 
Gulati, K., Ward, P. S., Lybbert, T. J., & Spielman, D. J. (2019). Intrahousehold Preference 
Heterogeneity and Demand for Labor-Saving Agricultural Technology: The Case of 
Mechanical Rice Transplanting in India. IFPRI Discussion Paper 1880. Washington, 
DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). 
Haider, H., Smale, M., & Theriault, V. (2018). Intensification and Intrahousehold 
Decisions: Fertilizer Adoption in Burkina Faso. World development, 105, 310-320. 
Hanna, R., Duflo, E., & Greenstone, M. (2016). Up in Smoke: The Influence of Household 
Behavior on the Long-run Impact of Improved Cooking Stoves. American Economic 
Journal: Economic Policy, 8(1), 80-114. 
Heath, R., & Tan, X. (forthcoming). Intrahousehold Bargaining, Female Autonomy, and 
Labor Supply: Theory and Evidence from India. Journal of the European Economic 
Association. 
Heß, S. (2017). Randomization Inference with Stata: A Guide and Software. Stata Journal, 
17(3), 630-651. 
Hoddinott, J., & Haddad, L. (1995). Does Female Income Share Influence Household 
Expenditures? Evidence from Côte d'Ivoire. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and 
Statistics, 57(1), 77-96. 
Iyigun, M., & Walsh, R. P. (2007). Endogenous Gender Power, Household Labor Supply 
and the Demographic Transition. Journal of Development Economics, 82(1), 138-
155. 
Jack, B. K. (2013). Market Inefficiencies and the Adoption of Agricultural Technologies in 
Developing Countries. White paper prepared for the Agricultural Technology 
Adoption Initiative, JPAL (MIT) / CEGA (Berkeley). 
Jensen, R. T., & Miller, N. H. (2008). Giffen Behavior and Subsistence Consumption. 
American Economic Review, 98(4), 1553-77. 
Karlan, D., Osei, R., Osei-Akoto, I., & Udry, C. (2014). Agricultural Decisions after 
Relaxing Credit and Risk Constraints. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(2), 597-
36 
 
652. 
Lim, S. S., Winter-Nelson, A., & Arends-Kuenning, M. (2007). Household Bargaining 
Power and Agricultural Supply Response: Evidence from Ethiopian Coffee Growers. 
World Development, 35(7), 1204-1220. 
Lundberg, S., & Pollak, R. A. (1993). Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market. 
Journal of Political Economy, 101(6), 988-1010. 
McElroy, M. B. (1990). The Empirical Content of Nash-Bargained Household Behavior. 
Journal of Human Resources, 25(4), 559-583. 
Machina, H. 2002. Women’s Land Rights in Zambia: Policy Provisions, Legal 
Framework and Constraints. Paper presented at the 2002 Regional Conference 
on Women’s Land Rights, Harare, Zimbabwe, May 26–30. 
Magnan, N., Love, A., Mishili, F., and Sheremenko G. (2019). Husbands’ and Wives’ 
Risk Preferences and Improved Maize Adoption in Tanzania. Mimeo.  
Magruder, J. R. (2018). An Assessment of Experimental Evidence on Agricultural 
Technology Adoption in Developing Countries. Annual Review of Resource 
Economics, 10(1), 299-316. 
Manser, M., & Brown, M. (1980). Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining 
Analysis. International Economic Review, 21(1), 31-44. 
Mazzocco, M. (2007). Household Intertemporal Behaviour: A Collective Characterization 
and a Test of Commitment. Review of Economic Studies, 74(3), 857-895. 
McElroy, M. B., & Horney, M. J. (1981). Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a 
Generalization of the Theory of Demand. International Economic Review, 22(2), 
333-49. 
Miller, G., & Mobarak, A. M. (2013). Gender Differences in Preferences, Intra-household 
Externalities, and Low Demand for Improved Cookstoves (No. w18964). National 
Bureau of Economic Research.  
Mohapatra, S., & Simon, L. (2017). Intra-household Bargaining over Household 
Technology Adoption. Review of Economics of the Household, 15(4), 1263-1290. 
Pitt, M. M., Rosenzweig, M., & Hassan, N. (2010). Short-and Long-Term Health Effects of 
Burning Biomass in the Home in Low-Income Countries. Unpublished manuscript. 
Rangel, M. A., & Thomas, D. (2019). Decision-Making in Complex Households. NBER 
Working Paper No. 26511.  
Robinson, J. (2012). Limited Insurance within the Household: Evidence from a Field 
Experiment in Kenya. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 4(4), 140-
64. 
Schaner, S. (2015). Do Opposites Detract? Intrahousehold Preference Heterogeneity and 
Inefficient Strategic Savings. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 7(2), 
135-74. 
37 
 
Slootmaker, C. (2014). Three Essays on Gender Inequality, Dynamic Bargaining, and 
Technology Adoption in Subsistence Agriculture (Doctoral dissertation, Colorado 
State University. Libraries). 
Takahashi, K., Ikegami, M., Sheahan, M., & Barrett, C. B. (2016). Experimental evidence 
on the drivers of index-based livestock insurance demand in Southern Ethiopia. 
World Development, 78, 324-340. 
Thomas, D. (1990). Intra-Household Resource Allocation: An Inferential Approach.  
Journal of Human Resources, 25(4), 635-664. 
Udry, C. (1996). Gender, Agricultural Production, and the Theory of the Household. 
Journal of Political Economy, 104(5), 1010-1046. 
von Braun, J., & Webb, P. J. (1989). The Impact of New Crop Technology on the 
Agricultural Division of Labor in a West African Setting. Economic Development 
and Cultural Change, 37(3), 513. 
Walther, S. (2018). Noncooperative Decision Making in the Household: Evidence from 
Malawi. Journal of Development Economics, 134, 428-442. 
Wotela, K. (2008). Deriving Traditional Reproductive Regimes to Explain Subnational 
Fertility Differentials in Zambia (Doctoral dissertation, University of Cape Town). 
Young, A. (2019). Channeling Fisher: Randomization Tests and the Statistical 
Insignificance of Seemingly Significant Experimental Results. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 134(2), 557-598. 
Zepeda, L., & Castillo, M. (1997). The Role of Husbands and Wives in Farm Technology 
Choice. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 79(2), 583-588. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
 
Figure 1. Project area 
Notes: The top right panel shows administrative districts across Zambia and the red-colored one is Masaiti district in 
Copperbelt Province.   
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Figure 2. Optimal household demand for rice seeds 
Notes: The parameter values for this Figure are presented in Table 5. 
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Figure 3. Heterogeneous treatment effects on household demands by the identity of dambo manager 
Notes: Figure shows point estimates for the impact of transportation voucher on household demand and their 95% 
confidence intervals by category. The statistical differences are found for the following hypothessis testing. p-values 
(randomization inference p-values) for H0:(1)=(2) are 0.02 (0.02) in the left panel and 0.01 (0.02) in the right panel. p-
values values (randomization inference p-values) for H0:(2)=(4) are 0.00 (0.09) in the left panel and 0.00 (0.03) in the 
right panel. See Appendix Table 3 for the full estimation results. 
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Figure 4. Heterogeneous treatment effects on spousal demand for rice seeds 
Notes: Figure shows point estimates for the impact of transportation voucher on spousal demand for rice and their 95% 
confidence intervals by category. The statistical differences are found for the following hypothessis testing. For the wife’s 
demands, p-values (randomization inference p-values) for H0:(1)=(2) are 0.02 (0.02) in the left panel and 0.00 (0.01) in 
the right panel. p-values (randomization inference p-values) for H0:(3)=(4) are 0.05 (0.02) in the left panel and 0.11 (0.10) 
in the right panel. p-values (randomization inference p-values) for H0:(2)=(4) are 0.03 (0.29) in the left panel and 0.00 
(0.05) in the right panel. For the husband’s’ demands, p-values (randomization inference p-values) for H0:(2)=(4) are 0.02 
(0.14) in the left panel and 0.04 (0.27) in the right panel. See Appendix Table 4 for the full estimation results.    
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Figure 5. Heterogeneous treatment effects on who came to sales meeting (left) and future production plan (right) 
Notes: The left panel shows point estimates for the impact of transportation voucher on the probability that wife (husband) 
came to the rice sales meeting with red (blue) symbol and their 95% confidence intervals by category. The right panel 
shows point estimates for the impact of transportation voucher on the probability of answering wife (husband) in response 
to the question of “who mainly grow rice?” with red (blue) symbol and their 95% confidence intervals by category. The 
statistical differences are found for the following hypothessis testing. For the wife, p-values (RI p-values) for H0:(1)=(2) 
are 0.07 (0.09) in the left panel and 0.01 (0.02) in the right panel. p-value (RI p-value) for H0:(3)=(4) is 0.08 (0.07) in the 
left panel. p-value (RI p-value) for H0:(2)=(4) is 0.02 (0.02) in the right. For the husband, p-value (RI p-value) for 
H0:(1)=(2) is 0.06 (0.09) in the right panel. p-values (RI p-value) for H0:(2)=(4) is 0.05 (0.26) in the left panel and 0.00 
(0.13) in the right panel. See Appendix Table 6 for the full estimation results.                         
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Figure 6. Heterogeneous treatment effects on household demand among married and single 
female households 
Notes: SFH stands for single female households. Figure shows point estimates for the impact of transportation voucher on 
household demand and their 95% confidence intervals by category. The statistical differences are found for the following 
hypothessis testing. p-value (randomization inference p-values) for H0:(1)=(2) is 0.03 (0.13) in the right panel. See 
Appendix Table 7 for the full estimation results. 
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Figure 7. Heterogeneous treatment effects on communication among spouses 
Notes: Figure shows point estimates for the impact of transportation voucher on the likelihood of spousal communication 
about voucher (left) and rice production (right) and their 95% confidence intervals by category. The statistical differences 
are found for the following hypothessis testing. For the left panel, p-values (randomization inference p-values) are 0.12 
(0.18) for H0:(1)=(2), 0.07 (0.05) for H0:(3)=(4), and 0.03 (0.05) for H0:(1)=(3). No statistical significances were detected 
in the right panel. See Appendix Table 9 for the full estimation results.  
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Figure 8. Heterogeneous treatment effects on knowledge gaps  
Notes: Figure shows point estimates for the treatment effect of transportation voucher on the total number of the correct 
responses to five multiple-choice questions about rice cultivation and their 95% confidence intervals by category. See the 
footnote of Appendix Table 11 for the detail on the questions. No statistical dificances are detected for the wife’s responses. 
For the husband’s knowledge score, statistical difference is found for the following hypothessis testing: p-value 
(randomization inference p-values) is 0.02 (0.05) for H0:(1)=(2). See Appendix Table 12 for the full estimation results. 
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Figure 9. Heterogeneous treatment effects on perceptions about rice as cash crop 
Notes: Figure shows point estimates for the treatment impact of transportation voucher on the dummy taking 1 if the 
respondent agree with the statement “rice is cash crop” and their 95% confidence intervals by category. Estimates about 
wife (husband)’s answers are shown in red (blue). See Appendix Table 13 for the full estimation results. 
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Figure 10. Heterogeneous treatment effects on perceptions about rice as female/male crop 
Notes: Figure shows point estimates for the treatment effect of transportation voucher on the agreement to the statement 
“rice is female crop” (left) and “rice is male crop” (right) and their 95% confidence intervals by category. Estimates about 
wife (husband)’s answers are shown in red (blue). The omitted category here is gender-neutral crop. See Appendix Table 
13 for the full estimation results. 
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Table 1. Baseline characteristics and balance check 
(1) (2) (3) (4) F-test
TF TM C Total for joint
Variable Mean/SD Mean/SD Mean/SD Mean/SD orthogonality
family size 5.80 5.80 5.77 5.79 0.99
[2.12] [2.06] [2.31] [2.15]
land size (ha) 2.39 3.33 2.91 2.92 0.05*
[2.66] [3.40] [3.24] [3.16]
value of assets (K1000) 2.73 3.77 3.83 3.47 0.25
[3.60] [5.29] [7.84] [5.77]
=1 if grown rice in last 10 years 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.28
[0.28] [0.23] [0.19] [0.24]
=1 if household owns dambo 0.42 0.41 0.35 0.39 0.50
[0.50] [0.49] [0.48] [0.49]
=1 if wife manages any land 0.21 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.37
[0.41] [0.36] [0.38] [0.38]
=1 if wife manages dambo 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.67
[0.33] [0.29] [0.29] [0.30]
=1 if husband manages dambo 0.30 0.32 0.26 0.29 0.60
[0.46] [0.47] [0.44] [0.46]
age(wife) 35.92 39.97 39.10 38.48 0.03**
[11.95] [13.36] [12.99] [12.92]
age(hsb) 41.63 46.08 45.20 44.47 0.03**
[12.69] [15.04] [14.17] [14.20]
years of education(wife) 5.90 6.05 5.71 5.90 0.62
[2.86] [2.92] [2.79] [2.86]
years of education(hsb) 7.67 7.18 7.25 7.35 0.37
[2.49] [3.27] [2.93] [2.95]
financial autonomy(K100)(wife) 0.73 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.94
[0.89] [0.88] [0.91] [0.89]
financial autonomy(K100)(hsb) 0.68 0.76 0.83 0.76 0.40
[0.66] [0.86] [0.94] [0.83]
non-farm income (K1000/year)(wife) 0.25 0.49 0.57 0.44 0.49
[1.33] [1.79] [3.04] [2.13]
non-farm income (K1000/year)(hsb) 2.36 2.70 2.20 2.45 0.63
[3.50] [5.34] [3.64] [4.37]
risk preference(wife) 0.70 0.73 0.68 0.71 0.25
[0.28] [0.25] [0.28] [0.27]
risk preference(hsb) 0.70 0.72 0.74 0.72 0.62
[0.26] [0.28] [0.22] [0.26]
N 117 155 112 384  
Notes: “hsb” stands for husband. Entries in the last column are p-values from the F-test for the equality across treatment 
status. The index for financial autonomy was created based on the following question “How much can you spend (e.g. 
purhcasing some commodities) at one time without consulting your spouse?”. The options are “less than K10”, “K10-
K30”, “K30-K50”, “K50-K100”, “K100-K300”, “K300-K500”, and “more than K500”. We use the intermediate value for 
each option as a proxy for financial autonomy. Risk preferece parameters are elicited from a Binswanger (1980)-style 
hyptoethical game. Six available options are (K5, K5), (K4, K12), (K3, K16), (K2, K19), (K1, K21), and (K0, K22). Risk 
parameters corresponding to each option are 1, 0.75, 0.6, 0.5, 0.33, and 0. The higher value indicates more risk averse.  
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Table 2. Demand for rice seeds by treatment group 
(1) (2) (3)
TF TM C
Variable N Mean/SD N Mean/SD N Mean/SD
1 if purchased 117 0.32 155 0.37 112 0.28
[0.47] [0.49] [0.45]
Seeds purchased (kg) 117 0.89 155 1.11 112 0.58
[1.87] [2.00] [1.36]
Seeds conditional on purchase 37 2.81 58 2.97 31 2.10
[2.38] [2.28] [1.89]  
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Table 3. Plot characteristics: husband-managed vs. wife-managed plots 
(1) (2) (3) F-test
husband wife Total for joint
Variable N Mean/SD N Mean/SD N Mean/SD orthogonality
total land size (ha) 592 1.68 99 1.00 691 1.59 0.01***
[2.54] [1.37] [2.42]
=1 if dambo 592 0.19 99 0.38 691 0.22 0.00***
[0.39] [0.49] [0.41]
=1 if lowland 592 0.31 99 0.10 691 0.28 0.00***
[0.46] [0.30] [0.45]
=1 if garden 592 0.32 99 0.48 691 0.34 0.00***
[0.47] [0.50] [0.48]
=1 if soil is bad 592 0.13 99 0.05 691 0.11 0.03**
[0.33] [0.22] [0.32]
=1 if fallowed in 17/18 rainy season 592 0.16 99 0.19 691 0.17 0.46
[0.37] [0.40] [0.37]
=1 if planted maize in 17/18 rainy season 592 0.61 99 0.34 691 0.57 0.00***
[0.49] [0.48] [0.50]
amount of fertilizer (kg/ha) applied in 17/18 rainy season 463 78.16 52 51.25 515 75.44 0.00***
[58.80] [65.86] [60.03]
=1 if purchased 539 0.24 90 0.13 629 0.23 0.02**
[0.43] [0.34] [0.42]
=1 if inherited 539 0.31 90 0.30 629 0.31 0.85
[0.46] [0.46] [0.46]
=1 if walked in 539 0.13 90 0.21 629 0.14 0.03**
[0.33] [0.41] [0.35]
=1 if customary and no title 539 0.59 90 0.74 629 0.61 0.00***
[0.49] [0.44] [0.49]  Notes: The unit of observation is plot. The amount of fertilizer applied is conditional on cultivation during the 2017/18 rainy season. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 4. Household and spousal characteristics by dambo management 
(1) (2) (3) t-test t-test t-test F-test
wife manager husband manager no dambo p-value p-value p-value for joint
Variable Mean/SD Mean/SD Mean/SD (1)-(2) (1)-(3) (2)-(3) orthogonality
family size 5.97 6.35 5.49 0.39 0.16 0.00*** 0.00***
[1.97] [2.47] [1.95]
land size (ha) 4.27 3.10 2.62 0.02** 0.00*** 0.18 0.01***
[3.15] [2.57] [3.36]
value of assets (K1000) 3.84 3.40 3.45 0.60 0.73 0.94 0.92
[5.61] [4.01] [6.49]
=1 if grown rice in last 10 years 0.13 0.09 0.03 0.45 0.01*** 0.03** 0.02**
[0.34] [0.29] [0.18]
age(wife) 43.03 39.22 37.39 0.10 0.01** 0.22 0.03**
[12.40] [12.41] [13.11]
age(hsb) 50.34 44.38 43.55 0.02** 0.01*** 0.61 0.02**
[13.80] [13.25] [14.53]
years of education(wife) 5.03 6.55 5.73 0.00*** 0.18 0.01** 0.01***
[2.89] [2.32] [3.04]
years of education(hsb) 7.50 7.39 7.30 0.84 0.71 0.81 0.92
[2.60] [2.97] [3.01]
financial autonomy(K100)(wife) 0.78 0.72 0.69 0.71 0.56 0.76 0.83
[0.81] [0.86] [0.92]
financial autonomy(K100)(hsb) 0.98 0.77 0.71 0.18 0.08* 0.53 0.19
[1.01] [0.73] [0.84]
non-farm income (K1000/year)(wife) 0.92 0.51 0.33 0.45 0.03** 0.46 0.25
[2.16] [3.12] [1.40]
non-farm income (K1000/year)(hsb) 3.62 2.26 2.35 0.15 0.10* 0.84 0.21
[6.76] [4.38] [3.83]
risk preference(wife) 0.69 0.79 0.67 0.02** 0.69 0.00*** 0.00***
[0.29] [0.22] [0.28]
risk preference(hsb) 0.72 0.75 0.70 0.49 0.77 0.10* 0.26
[0.28] [0.27] [0.25]
N 38 113 233  Notes: The unit of observation is household. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 5. Parameter values for the numerical model 
 
𝜃 q 𝑣௙ 𝑣௠ 𝜋 𝛾 T p 𝑦ଵ௠ ൌ 𝑦ଶ௠ 𝑦ଵ௙ ൌ 𝑦ଶ௙ 50 10 0.2 0.4 1.2 1 1 20 500 100 
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Table 6. Effect of transportation voucher on household demand for rice seeds 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TF/TM 0.463*** 0.079
(0.156) (0.048)
TF 0.456** 1.102* 0.069 0.066
(0.189) (0.575) (0.056) (0.057)
TM 0.468** 1.314** 0.085 0.088*
(0.186) (0.540) (0.055) (0.053)
wife manages dambo=1 -0.423* -0.422* -1.057 -0.076 -0.074 -0.070
(0.218) (0.217) (0.762) (0.073) (0.073) (0.075)
husband manages dambo=1 0.273 0.273 0.982** 0.128** 0.128** 0.118**
(0.205) (0.206) (0.462) (0.054) (0.054) (0.047)
age(wife) -0.007 -0.007 -0.053 -0.009* -0.009* -0.009**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.041) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
age(hsb) 0.013 0.013 0.078* 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.040) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
years of education(wife) 0.047* 0.047* 0.118 0.011 0.011 0.009
(0.027) (0.028) (0.083) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
years of education(hsb) 0.003 0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003
(0.030) (0.031) (0.084) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
financial autonomy(K100)(wife) -0.292*** -0.291*** -0.891*** -0.085*** -0.084*** -0.086***
(0.076) (0.077) (0.252) (0.023) (0.023) (0.027)
financial autonomy(K100)(hsb) -0.030 -0.030 0.202 0.039 0.039 0.038
(0.108) (0.109) (0.243) (0.029) (0.029) (0.026)
non-farm income (K1000/year)(wife) 0.039 0.039 0.033 0.003 0.003 0.004
(0.040) (0.040) (0.056) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
non-farm income (K1000/year)(hsb) 0.005 0.005 -0.002 0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.019) (0.019) (0.045) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
risk preference(wife) -0.073 -0.074 -0.788 -0.117 -0.118 -0.119
(0.259) (0.264) (0.752) (0.082) (0.083) (0.081)
risk preference(hsb) -0.444 -0.445 -1.262 -0.097 -0.097 -0.110
(0.336) (0.336) (0.855) (0.085) (0.085) (0.081)
TF=TM (p-value) . 0.95 0.67 . 0.76 0.66
wife manages=husband manages(p-value) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Model OLS OLS Tobit OLS OLS Probit
HH controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Camp FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control HH's mean of dep. var. 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.28 0.28 0.28
R squared 0.30 0.30 0.22 0.22
N 384 384 384 384 384 384
Seeds purchased (kg) 1 if purchased
 Notes: The dependent variables are quantity of seeds purchased in kg for columns 1-3 and a binary variable for purchase for 
columns 4-6. The values in column 6 are marginal effects obtained from the Probit model estimation. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Household controls include family size, total area of land owned, total value 
of household assets, and a dummy for past experience of rice cultivation.  
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Table 7. Effects on actual rice planting of correspondence between voucher recipient and 
dambo manager  
(1) (2)
matched HHs=1 0.106 0.316*
(0.077) (0.190)
unmatched HHs=1 -0.005 -0.026
(0.068) (0.194)
TF 0.064 0.204
(0.045) (0.143)
TM 0.030 0.008
(0.043) (0.122)
wife manages dambo=1 -0.066 -0.254
(0.060) (0.197)
husband manages dambo=1 -0.000 -0.103
(0.053) (0.149)
Sample whole sample purchase HHs
H0:TF=TM (p-value) 0.40 0.11
H0:TF=TM (bootstrap p-value) 0.40 0.14
H0:TF=TM (RI p-value) 0.41 0.08
H0:matched HHs=unmatched HHs (p-value) 0.08 0.05
H0:matched HHs=unmatched HHs (bootstrap p-value) 0.08 0.09
H0:matched HHs=unmatched HHs (RI p-value) 0.00 0.00
Control HH's mean of dep. var. 0.06 0.22
R squared 0.10 0.17
N 347 119  Notes: The dependent variables are an indicator variable for rice planting in the 2018/19 rainy season. OLS was used for the 
estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Bootstrap and randomization inference p-values are estimated based on 
5000 replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The same set of household controls and spousal characteristics as in Table 
6 are included but not reported.  
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Appendix Figure 1. Possibility of joint production by availability of voucher 
Notes: This figure is drawn with the parameters presented in Table 5 and 𝜇 ൌ 0.5. The top panel shows the combination of 
Nash solutions and threat points when the wife manages a suitable plot for rice production. The bottom panel shows the 
combination of Nash solutions and threat points when the husband manages a suitable plot for rice production. In both panels, 
the outer pareto frontier is for the case when the voucher is available, while the inner pareto frontier is for the case when the 
voucher is not available.   
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 Appendix Figure 2. Heterogeneous treatment effects on spousal preferences 
Notes: The panel shows point estimates for the impact of transportation voucher on the probability of answering wife (husband) 
in response to the question of “who wanted rice more?” with red (blue) symbol and their confidence intervals by cateory. See 
Appendix Table 5 for the full estimation results.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) TF when wife manages dambo
(2) TM when wife manages dambo
(3) TF when husband manages dambo
(4) TM when husband manages dambo
-1 -.5 0 .5 1
wife husband
Who wanted rice more?
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 Appendix Figure 3. Heterogeneous treatment effects on actual rice planting 
Notes: Figure shows point estimates for the impact of transportation voucher on actual rice planting and their 95% confidence 
intervals by category. Estimates in the left panel are based on the whole sample, while those in the right panel are based on the 
sample limited to 119 purchase households. The statistical differences are found for the following hypothessis testing. p-value 
(RI p-value) for H0:(1)=(2) is 0.05 (0.04) in the left panel. p-values (RI p-value) for H0:(2)=(4) are 0.00 (0.02) in the left panel 
and 0.08 (0.10) in the right panel. See Appendix Table 10 for the full estimation results. 
 
 
  
(1) TF when wife manages dambo
(2) TM when wife manages dambo
(3) TF when husband manages dambo
(4) TM when husband manages dambo
-.2 0 .2 .4 -.5 0 .5 1
whole sample purchase households
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Appendix Table 1. Determinants of plot managed by wife 
(1) (2)
=1 if dambo 0.079* 0.171***
(0.042) (0.058)
=1 if lowland -0.127*** 0.157***
(0.025) (0.049)
=1 if soil is good -0.012 0.052
(0.028) (0.055)
=1 if soil is bad -0.103*** -0.063
(0.035) (0.075)
total land size (ha) -0.010*** -0.022**
(0.004) (0.010)
camp FE Yes No
HH FE No Yes
Mean of dependent variable 0.14 0.14
R squared 0.08 0.73
N 691 691  Notes: The unit of observation is plot. The dependent variables are an indicator variable for wife-managed plot. The reference 
category for dambo and lowland is highland. OLS is used for the estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Appendix Table 2. Effect of transportation voucher on purchase of more than or equal to 2 
kilogram of rice seeds 
(1) (2) (3)
TF/TM 0.131***
(0.039)
TF 0.115** 0.147***
(0.047) (0.054)
TM 0.143*** 0.169***
(0.046) (0.049)
wife manages dambo=1 -0.045 -0.042 -0.028
(0.064) (0.064) (0.063)
husband manages dambo=1 0.086* 0.086* 0.074*
(0.051) (0.051) (0.042)
age(wife) -0.007 -0.007 -0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
age(hsb) 0.009** 0.009** 0.009**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
years of education(wife) 0.015* 0.015* 0.017**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
years of education(hsb) -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
financial autonomy(K100)(wife) -0.057** -0.056** -0.043*
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
financial autonomy(K100)(hsb) 0.021 0.020 0.017
(0.029) (0.029) (0.022)
non-farm income (K1000/year)(wife) 0.004 0.004 0.003
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
non-farm income (K1000/year)(hsb) 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
risk preference(wife) -0.010 -0.012 -0.035
(0.072) (0.073) (0.071)
risk preference(hsb) -0.114 -0.114 -0.095
(0.080) (0.080) (0.071)
TF=TM (p-value) . 0.57 0.60
wife access=husband access (p-value) 0.08 0.08 0.12
Model OLS OLS Probit
HH controls Yes Yes Yes
Camp FE Yes Yes Yes
Control HH's mean of dep. var. 0.13 0.13
R squared 0.23 0.24
N 384 384 384  Notes: The dependent variables are a binary variable equal to 1 if household purchases more than or equal to 2kg of rice seeds. 
The values in column 3 are marginal effects obtained from the Probit model estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The same set of household controls as in Table 6 are included but not reported. 
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Appendix Table 3. Heterogeneous treatment effects by the identity of dambo manager 
(1) (2)
Seeds purchased (kg) 1 if purchased
TF 0.260 -0.014
(0.238) (0.069)
TF # wife manages dambo=1 0.491 0.296*
(0.565) (0.177)
TF # husband manages dambo=1 0.497 0.182
(0.451) (0.131)
TM 0.581** 0.116
(0.243) (0.071)
TM # wife manages dambo=1 -0.813 -0.217
(0.501) (0.160)
TM # husband manages dambo=1 -0.102 -0.024
(0.472) (0.134)
wife manages dambo=1 -0.285 -0.094
(0.380) (0.120)
husband manages dambo=1 0.165 0.084
(0.274) (0.101)
H0:TF=TM (p-value) 0.18 0.05
H0:TF=TM (bootstrap p-value) 0.17 0.04
H0:TF=TM (RI p-value) 0.17 0.04
(1) TF when wife manages dambo 0.47 0.19
p-value 0.23 0.15
(2) TM when wife manages dambo -0.52 -0.20
p-value 0.06 0.05
(3) TF when husb manages dambo 0.92 0.25
p-value 0.01 0.01
(4) TM when husb manages dambo 0.64 0.18
p-value 0.08 0.04
H0:(1)=(2) (p-value) 0.02 0.01
H0:(1)=(2) (bootstrap p-value) 0.03 0.02
H0:(1)=(2) (RI p-value) 0.02 0.02
H0:(3)=(4) (p-value) 0.54 0.46
H0:(3)=(4) (bootstrap p-value) 0.53 0.47
H0:(3)=(4) (RI p-value) 0.53 0.46
H0:(1)=(3) (p-value) 0.33 0.64
H0:(1)=(3) (bootstrap p-value) 0.34 0.66
H0:(1)=(3) (RI p-value) 0.85 0.94
H0:(2)=(4) (p-value) 0.00 0.00
H0:(2)=(4) (bootstrap p-value) 0.00 0.00
H0:(2)=(4) (RI p-value) 0.08 0.02
Control HH's mean of dep. var. 0.55 0.25
R squared 0.31 0.24
N 384 384  Notes: The dependent variables are quantity of seeds purchased in kg for column (1) and an indicator dummy for purchase in 
column (2). OLS was used for the estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Bootstrap and randomization inference 
p-values are estimated based on 5000 replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The same set of household controls and 
spousal characteristics as in Table 6 are included but not reported.  
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Appendix Table 4. Heterogeneous treatment effects on spousal demand for rice seeds 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Seeds demanded by wife Seeds demanded by husb =1 if wife demands =1 if husb demands
TF 0.073 0.186 0.041 -0.041
(0.101) (0.230) (0.042) (0.064)
TF # wife manages dambo=1 0.341 0.129 0.271** 0.010
(0.269) (0.506) (0.136) (0.159)
TF # husband manages dambo=1 0.266 0.205 -0.033 0.173
(0.275) (0.422) (0.106) (0.115)
TM 0.055 0.525** 0.052 0.077
(0.113) (0.233) (0.042) (0.067)
TM # wife manages dambo=1 -0.181 -0.632 -0.094 -0.130
(0.195) (0.468) (0.077) (0.156)
TM # husband manages dambo=1 -0.184 0.068 -0.170* 0.134
(0.190) (0.466) (0.096) (0.115)
wife manages dambo=1 -0.178 -0.110 -0.065 -0.030
(0.151) (0.336) (0.057) (0.118)
husband manages dambo=1 0.108 0.044 0.158** -0.075
(0.144) (0.258) (0.078) (0.080)
H0:TF=TM (p-value) 0.86 0.15 0.81 0.05
(1) TF when wife manages dambo 0.24 0.21 0.25 -0.06
p-value 0.25 0.55 0.04 0.55
(2) TM when wife manages dambo -0.30 -0.22 -0.11 -0.08
p-value 0.04 0.40 0.04 0.38
(3) TF when husb manages dambo 0.45 0.44 0.17 0.06
p-value 0.04 0.21 0.02 0.53
(4) TM when husb manages dambo -0.02 0.64 0.04 0.14
p-value 0.85 0.09 0.46 0.11
H0:(1)=(2) (p-value) 0.02 0.28 0.00 0.85
H0:(1)=(2) (bootstrap p-value) 0.03 0.31 0.01 0.86
H0:(1)=(2) (RI p-value) 0.02 0.31 0.01 0.86
H0:(3)=(4) (p-value) 0.05 0.65 0.11 0.43
H0:(3)=(4) (bootstrap p-value) 0.05 0.64 0.11 0.42
H0:(3)=(4) (RI p-value) 0.02 0.67 0.10 0.44
H0:(1)=(3) (p-value) 0.47 0.59 0.55 0.30
H0:(1)=(3) (bootstrap p-value) 0.47 0.59 0.56 0.31
H0:(1)=(3) (RI p-value) 0.50 0.84 0.42 0.74
H0:(2)=(4) (p-value) 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.04
H0:(2)=(4) (bootstrap p-value) 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.05
H0:(2)=(4) (RI p-value) 0.29 0.14 0.05 0.27
Control HH's mean of dep. var. 0.14 0.41 0.05 0.19
R squared 0.23 0.26 0.17 0.17
N 384 384 384 384  Notes: OLS was used for the estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Bootstrap and randomization inference p-
values are estimated based on 5000 replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The same set of household controls and 
spousal characteristics as in Table 6 are included but not reported. 
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Appendix Table 5. Heterogeneous treatment effects on question-based spousal preferences 
(1) (2)
wife wants husband wants
TF 0.159 -0.085
(0.166) (0.153)
TF # wife manages dambo=1 0.779** -0.856***
(0.327) (0.317)
TF # husband manages dambo=1 -0.329 0.312
(0.257) (0.243)
TM 0.053 -0.009
(0.129) (0.126)
TM # wife manages dambo=1 0.144 -0.157
(0.258) (0.245)
TM # husband manages dambo=1 -0.275 0.217
(0.225) (0.215)
wife manages dambo=1 -0.407* 0.406**
(0.208) (0.184)
husband manages dambo=1 0.264 -0.224
(0.188) (0.180)
H0:TF=TM (p-value) 0.51 0.60
H0:TF=TM (bootstrap p-value) 0.53 0.61
H0:TF=TM (RI p-value) 0.47 0.58
(1) TF when wife manages dambo 0.53 -0.53
p-value 0.01 0.01
(2) TM when wife manages dambo -0.21 0.24
p-value 0.32 0.28
(3) TF when husb manages dambo 0.10 0.00
p-value 0.57 0.98
(4) TM when husb manages dambo 0.04 -0.02
p-value 0.76 0.90
H0:(1)=(2) (p-value) 0.01 0.01
H0:(1)=(2) (bootstrap p-value) 0.02 0.02
H0:(1)=(2) (RI p-value) 0.09 0.09
H0:(3)=(4) (p-value) 0.74 0.90
H0:(3)=(4) (bootstrap p-value) 0.75 0.90
H0:(3)=(4) (RI p-value) 0.74 0.91
H0:(1)=(3) (p-value) 0.06 0.02
H0:(1)=(3) (bootstrap p-value) 0.09 0.04
H0:(1)=(3) (RI p-value) 0.29 0.23
H0:(2)=(4) (p-value) 0.19 0.21
H0:(2)=(4) (bootstrap p-value) 0.31 0.33
H0:(2)=(4) (RI p-value) 0.56 0.66
Control HH's mean of dep. var. 0.22 0.78
R squared 0.32 0.34
N 126 126  Notes: The estimation sample is restricted to purchase households. The dependent variable for column 1 (2) is a dummy taking 
1 if the answer to the question of “Who wanted more rice?” was wife (husband). OLS was used for the estimation. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Bootstrap and randomization inference p-values are estimated based on 5000 replications. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The same set of household controls and spousal characteristics as in Table 6 are included but not 
reported.  
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Appendix Table 6. Heterogeneous treatment effects on other outcomes 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
wife came husband came wife grow husband grow
TF 0.048 -0.023 0.062 -0.048
(0.050) (0.063) (0.047) (0.063)
TF # wife manages dambo=1 0.128 0.005 0.286* 0.136
(0.149) (0.161) (0.153) (0.177)
TF # husband manages dambo=1 0.014 0.148 -0.005 0.239*
(0.110) (0.114) (0.105) (0.127)
TM 0.039 0.082 0.087* 0.093
(0.046) (0.066) (0.048) (0.067)
TM # wife manages dambo=1 -0.123 -0.138 -0.127 -0.246
(0.109) (0.160) (0.106) (0.153)
TM # husband manages dambo=1 -0.119 0.114 -0.026 0.023
(0.099) (0.113) (0.104) (0.125)
wife manages dambo=1 -0.001 -0.028 -0.018 -0.005
(0.076) (0.120) (0.073) (0.126)
husband manages dambo=1 0.084 -0.054 0.096 0.034
(0.082) (0.077) (0.075) (0.093)
H0:TF=TM (p-value) 0.85 0.09 0.63 0.02
H0:TF=TM (bootstrap p-value) 0.85 0.08 0.64 0.01
H0:TF=TM (RI p-value) 0.85 0.10 0.67 0.02
(1) TF when wife manages dambo 0.18 -0.05 0.33 0.08
p-value 0.17 0.65 0.01 0.50
(2) TM when wife manages dambo -0.09 -0.08 -0.06 -0.16
p-value 0.27 0.40 0.42 0.06
(3) TF when husb manages dambo 0.15 0.07 0.15 0.23
p-value 0.06 0.42 0.05 0.02
(4) TM when husb manages dambo 0.00 0.14 0.16 0.15
p-value 0.95 0.09 0.04 0.08
H0:(1)=(2) (p-value) 0.07 0.77 0.01 0.06
H0:(1)=(2) (bootstrap p-value) 0.07 0.78 0.01 0.08
H0:(1)=(2) (RI p-value) 0.09 0.78 0.02 0.09
H0:(3)=(4) (p-value) 0.08 0.48 0.96 0.47
H0:(3)=(4) (bootstrap p-value) 0.08 0.47 0.96 0.47
H0:(3)=(4) (RI p-value) 0.07 0.48 0.96 0.48
H0:(1)=(3) (p-value) 0.83 0.30 0.22 0.29
H0:(1)=(3) (bootstrap p-value) 0.83 0.32 0.23 0.31
H0:(1)=(3) (RI p-value) 0.78 0.75 0.12 0.79
H0:(2)=(4) (p-value) 0.27 0.05 0.02 0.00
H0:(2)=(4) (bootstrap p-value) 0.30 0.05 0.02 0.00
H0:(2)=(4) (RI p-value) 0.24 0.26 0.02 0.13
Control HH's mean of dep. var. 0.08 0.19 0.07 0.19
R squared 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.17
N 384 384 384 384  Notes: The dependent variables are a dummy indicated in the header of each column. “husb” stands for husband. OLS was 
used for the estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Bootstrap and randomization inference p-values are estimated 
based on 5000 replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The same set of household controls and spousal characteristics as 
in Table 6 are included but not reported.   
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Appendix Table 7. Heterogeneous treatment effects on household demand for rice seeds among 
married and single female households 
(1) (2)
Seeds purchased (kg) 1 if purchased
TF 0.408** 0.036
(0.206) (0.059)
TF # single female HH=1 -0.069 0.032
(0.363) (0.106)
TF # single female HH=1 # female manages dambo=1 -0.533 -0.366
(0.700) (0.265)
TF # female manages dambo=1 0.124 0.205
(0.525) (0.182)
single female HH=1 # female manages dambo=1 -0.107 -0.033
(0.488) (0.206)
female manages dambo=1 -0.100 -0.022
(0.297) (0.121)
single female HH=1 0.162 0.031
(0.176) (0.076)
other family member manages dambo=1 0.267 0.135**
(0.214) (0.065)
(1) TF for married HH with dambo 0.43 0.22
p-value 0.31 0.12
(2) TF for single female HH without dambo 0.50 0.10
p-value 0.12 0.25
(3) TF for single female HH with dambo -0.12 -0.12
p-value 0.67 0.20
H0:(1)=(3) (p-value) 0.22 0.03
H0:(1)=(3) (bootstrap p-value) 0.25 0.03
H0:(1)=(3) (RI p-value) 0.22 0.13
Sample TF and C households TF and C households
Control HH's mean of dep. var. 0.49 0.25
R squared 0.25 0.20
N 335 335  Notes: OLS was used for the estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Bootstrap and randomization inference p-
values are estimated based on 5000 replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The same set of household controls as in 
Table 6 are included but not reported. The following characteristics of females (i.e. wives or female heads) are also controlled 
but not reported: age, education level, non-farm income, and risk preferences.  
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Appendix Table 8. Understanding of voucher rule among treatment households 
(1) (2)
female=1 0.039 0.097
(0.096) (0.101)
dambo manager=1 # female=1 -0.050 -0.299
(0.173) (0.195)
spouse manages dambo=1 # female=1 0.163 -0.365**
(0.183) (0.182)
dambo manager=1 0.112 0.291***
(0.093) (0.108)
spouse manages dambo=1 0.020 0.322**
(0.151) (0.149)
Sample recepients non-recepients in treatment households
(1)female when she manages dambo 0.10 0.09
p-value 0.50 0.61
(2)male when spouse manages dambo 0.02 0.32
p-value 0.89 0.03
(3)female when spouse manages dambo 0.22 0.05
p-value 0.04 0.66
(4)male when he manages dambo 0.11 0.29
p-value 0.23 0.01
H0:(1)=(2)(p-value) 0.68 0.24
H0:(3)=(4)(p-value) 0.31 0.05
H0:(1)=(3)(p-value) 0.41 0.84
H0:(2)=(4)(p-value) 0.56 0.84
Camp FE Yes Yes
Males' mean of dep. var. 0.62 0.50
R squared 0.08 0.07
N 229 212  Notes: The unit of observation is individual. The dependent variable for column 1 is a dummy equal to 1 if the recipient knows 
that the transportation voucher can also be utilized by the spouse. The dependent variable for column 2 is a dummy equal to 1 
if the non-recipient knows that the transportation voucher can also be utilized by them as well as recipient. OLS was used for 
the estimation. Robust standard errors clustered by household in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The same set of 
household and individual characteristics as in Table 6 are included but not reported. 
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Appendix Table 9. Effect of voucher on spousal communication 
(1) (2)
Talked about voucher Talked about rice production
TF 0.893*** -0.033
(0.040) (0.040)
TF # wife manages dambo=1 0.103** 0.135
(0.052) (0.113)
TF # husband manages dambo=1 -0.015 0.074
(0.070) (0.072)
TM 0.925*** -0.009
(0.029) (0.029)
TM # wife manages dambo=1 -0.073 0.112
(0.092) (0.110)
TM # husband manages dambo=1 0.061* 0.047
(0.035) (0.066)
wife manages dambo=1 0.004 -0.072
(0.021) (0.116)
husband manages dambo=1 -0.007 -0.047
(0.022) (0.059)
H0:TF=TM (p-value) 0.51 0.52
H0:TF=TM (bootstrap p-value) 0.51 0.52
H0:TF=TM (RI p-value) 0.50 0.52
(1) TF when wife manages dambo 1.00 0.03
p-value 0.00 0.32
(2) TM when wife manages dambo 0.86 0.03
p-value 0.00 0.36
(3) TF when husb manages dambo 0.87 -0.01
p-value 0.00 0.86
(4) TM when husb manages dambo 0.98 -0.01
p-value 0.00 0.80
H0:(1)=(2) (p-value) 0.12 0.96
H0:(1)=(2) (bootstrap p-value) 0.14 0.97
H0:(1)=(2) (RI p-value) 0.18 0.94
H0:(3)=(4) (p-value) 0.07 0.93
H0:(3)=(4) (bootstrap p-value) 0.07 0.93
H0:(3)=(4) (RI p-value) 0.05 0.95
H0:(1)=(3) (p-value) 0.03 0.23
H0:(1)=(3) (bootstrap p-value) 0.03 0.29
H0:(1)=(3) (RI p-value) 0.05 0.51
H0:(2)=(4) (p-value) 0.18 0.25
H0:(2)=(4) (bootstrap p-value) 0.19 0.28
H0:(2)=(4) (RI p-value) 0.01 0.48
Control HH's mean of dep. var. 0.00 0.97
R squared 0.80 0.05
N 371 371  Notes: The dependent variables are a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent talks with his/her spouse about what is indicated in 
the header of each column. OLS was used for the estimation. Robust standard errors clustered by household in parentheses. 
Bootstrap and randomization inference p-values are estimated based on 5000 replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The 
same set of household controls and spousal characteristics as in Table 6 are included but not reported.   
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Appendix Table 10. Effect of voucher on actual rice planting in the 2018/19 crop season 
(1) (2)
TF 0.050 0.231
(0.048) (0.161)
TF # wife manages dambo=1 0.134 0.185
(0.118) (0.360)
TF # husband manages dambo=1 0.029 -0.048
(0.084) (0.219)
TM 0.041 -0.006
(0.045) (0.128)
TM # wife manages dambo=1 -0.068 0.065
(0.069) (0.291)
TM # husband manages dambo=1 0.090 0.358*
(0.088) (0.202)
wife manages dambo=1 -0.052 -0.196
(0.053) (0.230)
husband manages dambo=1 -0.004 -0.119
(0.057) (0.149)
Sample whole sample purchase HHs
H0:TF=TM (p-value) 0.86 0.15
H0:TF=TM (bootstrap p-value) 0.85 0.15
H0:TF=TM (RI p-value) 0.86 0.12
(1) TF when wife manages dambo 0.13 0.22
p-value 0.22 0.40
(2) TM when wife manages dambo -0.08 -0.14
p-value 0.09 0.49
(3) TF when husb manages dambo 0.08 0.06
p-value 0.21 0.71
(4) TM when husb manages dambo 0.13 0.23
p-value 0.06 0.14
H0:(1)=(2) (p-value) 0.05 0.15
H0:(1)=(2) (bootstrap p-value) 0.06 0.22
H0:(1)=(2) (RI p-value) 0.04 0.55
H0:(3)=(4) (p-value) 0.49 0.31
H0:(3)=(4) (bootstrap p-value) 0.49 0.35
H0:(3)=(4) (RI p-value) 0.53 0.35
H0:(1)=(3) (p-value) 0.61 0.59
H0:(1)=(3) (bootstrap p-value) 0.62 0.63
H0:(1)=(3) (RI p-value) 0.66 0.66
H0:(2)=(4) (p-value) 0.00 0.08
H0:(2)=(4) (bootstrap p-value) 0.00 0.10
H0:(2)=(4) (RI p-value) 0.02 0.10
Control HH's mean of dep. var. 0.06 0.22
R squared 0.10 0.17
N 347 119  Notes: The dependent variables are an indicator variable for rice planting in the 2018/19 rainy season. OLS was used for the 
estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Bootstrap and randomization inference p-values are estimated based on 
5000 replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The same set of household controls and spousal characteristics as in Table 
6 are included but not reported.  
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Appendix Table 11. Effect of gender and dambo management on knowledge 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 score
female=1 -0.044 0.104 -0.150 0.012 0.082 0.005
(0.138) (0.106) (0.141) (0.117) (0.110) (0.303)
dambo manager=1 # female=1 0.482** 0.045 0.082 0.243 -0.227 0.624
(0.219) (0.386) (0.351) (0.169) (0.303) (0.713)
spouse manages dambo=1 # female=1 -0.421* 0.026 -0.029 -0.196 0.105 -0.515
(0.220) (0.277) (0.193) (0.191) (0.275) (0.689)
dambo manager=1 -0.025 -0.308** 0.130 -0.096 -0.069 -0.367
(0.153) (0.148) (0.134) (0.128) (0.130) (0.341)
spouse manages dambo=1 0.370** -0.375 0.393** 0.133 -0.360 0.161
(0.162) (0.262) (0.167) (0.150) (0.236) (0.570)
(1)female when she manages dambo 0.41 -0.16 0.06 0.16 -0.21 0.26
p-value 0.02 0.65 0.85 0.24 0.45 0.69
(2)male when spouse manages dambo 0.37 -0.37 0.39 0.13 -0.36 0.16
p-value 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.38 0.13 0.78
(3)female when spouse manages dambo -0.10 -0.24 0.21 -0.05 -0.17 -0.35
p-value 0.58 0.10 0.11 0.72 0.26 0.43
(4)male when he manages dambo -0.02 -0.31 0.13 -0.10 -0.07 -0.37
p-value 0.87 0.04 0.33 0.45 0.60 0.28
H0:(1)=(2)(p-value) 0.76 0.58 0.29 0.84 0.66 0.89
H0:(3)=(4)(p-value) 0.67 0.69 0.50 0.75 0.49 0.96
H0:(1)=(3)(p-value) 0.00 0.81 0.63 0.14 0.89 0.39
H0:(2)=(4)(p-value) 0.03 0.82 0.10 0.15 0.24 0.37
Camp FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Males' mean of dep. var. 0.65 0.85 0.77 0.85 0.85 3.96
R squared 0.17 0.24 0.14 0.12 0.17 0.15
N 107 107 107 107 107 107  Notes: The unit of observation is individual. The sample is from control villages. The dependent variables in columns (1)-(5) 
are a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent got the right answer to the question about rice cultivation. Q1 is “Can upland rice be 
grown in maize plots?” and options are (1) Yes and (2) No. Q2 is “How many kgs of rice seeds are needed for cultivating 1 
lima?” and options are (1) 5kg, (2) 12.5 kg and (3) 25kg. Q3 is “How many seeds are needed for planting for 1 meter?” and 
options are (1) 50-60 seeds, (2) 100-120 seeds, and (3) 200-250 seeds. Q4 is “When is the best time for weeding (how many 
weeks after germination)?” and options are (1) no need for weeding, (2) after 1 week, and (3) after 3 weeks. Q5 was “How 
many days does it take for NERICA4 variety to be matured?” and options are (1) about 90 days, (2) about 120 days, and (3) 
about 150 days. OLS was used for the estimation. The dependent variable for column (6) is the total number of the right 
answers out of five multiple questions. Robust standard errors clustered by household in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 The same set of household and individual characteristics as in Table 6 are included but not reported. 
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Appendix Table 12. Effect of voucher on knowledge about rice cultivation by spouse 
(1) (2)
wife's score husband's score
TF 0.020 0.065
(0.235) (0.209)
TF # wife manages dambo=1 0.077 0.043
(0.485) (0.479)
TF # husband manages dambo=1 0.443 0.731**
(0.372) (0.334)
TM -0.165 -0.119
(0.216) (0.183)
TM # wife manages dambo=1 -0.335 -0.885*
(0.629) (0.501)
TM # husband manages dambo=1 0.423 0.576*
(0.361) (0.307)
wife manages dambo=1 0.088 0.388
(0.396) (0.334)
husband manages dambo=1 -0.309 -0.446*
(0.279) (0.232)
H0:TF=TM (p-value) 0.38 0.37
H0:TF=TM (bootstrap p-value) 0.38 0.37
H0:TF=TM (RI p-value) 0.37 0.34
(1) TF when wife manages dambo 0.18 0.50
p-value 0.58 0.16
(2) TM when wife manages dambo -0.41 -0.62
p-value 0.41 0.11
(3) TF when husb manages dambo 0.15 0.35
p-value 0.60 0.18
(4) TM when husb manages dambo -0.05 0.01
p-value 0.85 0.96
H0:(1)=(2) (p-value) 0.26 0.02
H0:(1)=(2) (bootstrap p-value) 0.27 0.03
H0:(1)=(2) (RI p-value) 0.28 0.05
H0:(3)=(4) (p-value) 0.49 0.21
H0:(3)=(4) (bootstrap p-value) 0.49 0.21
H0:(3)=(4) (RI p-value) 0.52 0.21
H0:(1)=(3) (p-value) 0.93 0.71
H0:(1)=(3) (bootstrap p-value) 0.93 0.72
H0:(1)=(3) (RI p-value) 0.94 0.72
H0:(2)=(4) (p-value) 0.48 0.11
H0:(2)=(4) (bootstrap p-value) 0.48 0.13
H0:(2)=(4) (RI p-value) 0.23 0.05
Control HH's mean of dep. var. 3.61 3.47
R squared 0.12 0.13
N 291 329  Notes: The dependent variables are the total number of the correct answers out of the following five multiple-choice questions 
about rice cultivation. Q1 is “Can upland rice be grown in maize plots?” and options are (1) Yes and (2) No. Q2 is “How many 
kgs of rice seeds are needed for cultivating 1 lima?” and options are (1) 5kg, (2) 12.5 kg and (3) 25kg. Q3 is “How many seeds 
are needed for planting for 1 meter?” and options are (1) 50-60 seeds, (2) 100-120 seeds, and (3) 200-250 seeds. Q4 is “When 
is the best time for weeding (how many weeks after germination)?” and options are (1) no need for weeding, (2) after 1 week, 
and (3) after 3 weeks. Q5 was “How many days does it take for NERICA4 variety to be matured?” and options are (1) about 
90 days, (2) about 120 days, and (3) about 150 days. OLS was used for the estimation. Robust standard errors clustered by 
household in parentheses. Bootstrap and randomization inference p-values are estimated based on 5000 replications. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The same set of household controls and spousal characteristics as in Table 6 are included but not 
reported.  
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Appendix Table 13. Effect of voucher on perceptions about rice 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
cash crop/wife cash crop/husb female crop/wife female crop/husb male crop/wife male crop/husb
TF 0.043 -0.022 -0.012 0.005 -0.067 0.127
(0.098) (0.092) (0.070) (0.071) (0.097) (0.093)
TF # wife manages dambo=1 0.176 0.434** -0.135 -0.032 0.164 0.023
(0.225) (0.220) (0.231) (0.198) (0.211) (0.246)
TF # husband manages dambo=1 -0.117 0.297* 0.096 -0.054 -0.021 -0.230
(0.172) (0.165) (0.128) (0.120) (0.161) (0.164)
TM 0.039 -0.023 -0.041 -0.074 -0.102 0.017
(0.094) (0.086) (0.058) (0.059) (0.089) (0.083)
TM # wife manages dambo=1 -0.028 -0.014 -0.177 -0.241* 0.488** 0.107
(0.248) (0.241) (0.228) (0.145) (0.214) (0.251)
TM # husband manages dambo=1 -0.006 0.261* 0.089 0.114 0.067 -0.009
(0.160) (0.150) (0.111) (0.116) (0.164) (0.154)
wife manages dambo=1 -0.056 -0.134 0.348* 0.134 -0.172 0.126
(0.184) (0.186) (0.183) (0.138) (0.149) (0.190)
husband manages dambo=1 0.046 -0.129 -0.014 -0.064 -0.085 0.065
(0.127) (0.122) (0.090) (0.099) (0.133) (0.123)
H0:TF=TM (p-value) 0.97 0.99 0.64 0.21 0.69 0.21
H0:TF=TM (bootstrap p-value) 0.97 0.99 0.64 0.21 0.69 0.21
H0:TF=TM (RI p-value) 0.98 0.99 0.65 0.18 0.69 0.21
(1) TF when wife manages dambo 0.16 0.28 0.20 0.11 -0.08 0.28
p-value 0.22 0.02 0.14 0.45 0.63 0.08
(2) TM when wife manages dambo -0.04 -0.17 0.13 -0.18 0.21 0.25
p-value 0.80 0.27 0.33 0.00 0.20 0.14
(3) TF when husb manages dambo -0.03 0.15 0.07 -0.11 -0.17 -0.04
p-value 0.81 0.21 0.45 0.16 0.11 0.73
(4) TM when husb manages dambo 0.08 0.11 0.03 -0.02 -0.12 0.07
p-value 0.46 0.25 0.69 0.75 0.24 0.46
H0:(1)=(2) (p-value) 0.28 0.01 0.69 0.03 0.15 0.90
H0:(1)=(2) (bootstrap p-value) 0.31 0.02 0.70 0.04 0.16 0.91
H0:(1)=(2) (RI p-value) 0.30 0.02 0.70 0.06 0.19 0.91
H0:(3)=(4) (p-value) 0.39 0.75 0.72 0.26 0.62 0.34
H0:(3)=(4) (bootstrap p-value) 0.39 0.75 0.73 0.27 0.62 0.34
H0:(3)=(4) (RI p-value) 0.38 0.74 0.71 0.26 0.62 0.33
H0:(1)=(3) (p-value) 0.18 0.34 0.37 0.12 0.53 0.06
H0:(1)=(3) (bootstrap p-value) 0.20 0.35 0.38 0.13 0.54 0.07
H0:(1)=(3) (RI p-value) 0.17 0.35 0.49 0.03 0.80 0.30
H0:(2)=(4) (p-value) 0.49 0.08 0.50 0.01 0.04 0.31
H0:(2)=(4) (bootstrap p-value) 0.50 0.09 0.51 0.02 0.05 0.33
H0:(2)=(4) (RI p-value) 0.25 0.01 0.61 0.05 0.11 0.71
Control HH's mean of dep. var. 0.63 0.56 0.12 0.16 0.35 0.32
R squared 0.06 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.07
N 291 329 291 329 291 329  Notes: The dependent variables are a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent agreed to the statement shown in the header of each 
column. OLS was used for the estimation. Robust standard errors clustered by household in parentheses. Bootstrap and 
randomization inference p-values are estimated based on 5000 replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The same set of 
household controls and spousal characteristics as in Table 6 are included but not reported. 
